Bidding for brains: Intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers
We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a g...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of development economics 2011-05, Vol.95 (1), p.77-87 |
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| container_title | Journal of development economics |
| container_volume | 95 |
| creator | McAusland, Carol Kuhn, Peter |
| description | We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the ‘poaching’ of their ‘brains’ by larger, wealthier markets. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.02.002 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of development economics, 2011-05, Vol.95 (1), p.77-87 |
| issn | 0304-3878 1872-6089 |
| language | eng |
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| source | RePEc; ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Brain drain Development Economic incentives Economic models Game theory Intellectual property Intellectual property rights Intellectual property rights Development Brain drain International labor migration International International labor migration International migration Knowledge economy Labour migration Migration Nash equilibrium Skilled workers Studies |
| title | Bidding for brains: Intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers |
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