Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self-Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences

This article assesses the influence of income inequality on the public's policy mood. Recent work has produced divergent perspectives on the relationship between inequality, public opinion, and government redistribution. One group of scholars suggests that unequal representation of different in...

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Veröffentlicht in:American journal of political science 2010-10, Vol.54 (4), p.855-870
Hauptverfasser: Kelly, Nathan J., Enns, Peter K.
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creator Kelly, Nathan J.
Enns, Peter K.
description This article assesses the influence of income inequality on the public's policy mood. Recent work has produced divergent perspectives on the relationship between inequality, public opinion, and government redistribution. One group of scholars suggests that unequal representation of different income groups reproduces inequality as politicians respond to the preferences of the rich. Another group of scholars pays relatively little attention to distributional outcomes but shows that government is generally just as responsive to the poor as to the rich. Utilizing theoretical insights from comparative political economy and time-series data from 1952 to 2006, supplemented with cross-sectional analysis where appropriate, we show that economic inequality is, in fact, self-reinforcing, but that this is fully consistent with the idea that government tends to respond equally to rich and poor in its policy enactments.
doi_str_mv 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00472.x
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source Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Access via Wiley Online Library; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing
subjects Conservatism
Cross-sectional analysis
Democracy
Economic activity
Economic models
Economic policy
Elites
Government policy
Income distribution
Income Inequality
Income redistribution
Inequality
Liberalism
Modeling
Policy making
Political Economy
Politicians
Preferences
Public Opinion
Public Policy
Representation
title Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self-Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences
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