Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self-Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences
This article assesses the influence of income inequality on the public's policy mood. Recent work has produced divergent perspectives on the relationship between inequality, public opinion, and government redistribution. One group of scholars suggests that unequal representation of different in...
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Veröffentlicht in: | American journal of political science 2010-10, Vol.54 (4), p.855-870 |
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description | This article assesses the influence of income inequality on the public's policy mood. Recent work has produced divergent perspectives on the relationship between inequality, public opinion, and government redistribution. One group of scholars suggests that unequal representation of different income groups reproduces inequality as politicians respond to the preferences of the rich. Another group of scholars pays relatively little attention to distributional outcomes but shows that government is generally just as responsive to the poor as to the rich. Utilizing theoretical insights from comparative political economy and time-series data from 1952 to 2006, supplemented with cross-sectional analysis where appropriate, we show that economic inequality is, in fact, self-reinforcing, but that this is fully consistent with the idea that government tends to respond equally to rich and poor in its policy enactments. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00472.x |
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Recent work has produced divergent perspectives on the relationship between inequality, public opinion, and government redistribution. One group of scholars suggests that unequal representation of different income groups reproduces inequality as politicians respond to the preferences of the rich. Another group of scholars pays relatively little attention to distributional outcomes but shows that government is generally just as responsive to the poor as to the rich. Utilizing theoretical insights from comparative political economy and time-series data from 1952 to 2006, supplemented with cross-sectional analysis where appropriate, we show that economic inequality is, in fact, self-reinforcing, but that this is fully consistent with the idea that government tends to respond equally to rich and poor in its policy enactments.</description><subject>Conservatism</subject><subject>Cross-sectional analysis</subject><subject>Democracy</subject><subject>Economic activity</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economic policy</subject><subject>Elites</subject><subject>Government policy</subject><subject>Income distribution</subject><subject>Income Inequality</subject><subject>Income redistribution</subject><subject>Inequality</subject><subject>Liberalism</subject><subject>Modeling</subject><subject>Policy making</subject><subject>Political Economy</subject><subject>Politicians</subject><subject>Preferences</subject><subject>Public Opinion</subject><subject>Public Policy</subject><subject>Representation</subject><issn>0092-5853</issn><issn>1540-5907</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2010</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkU9vEzEQxS0EEiHlIyBZXDht8K7XfxaJQ1va0iqlgRR6tLzOLDjd2Km9q2a_PQ6LcugFfBjb895vpNFDCOdklqfzfj3LWUkyVhExK0jqElKKYrZ7hiYH4TmaEFIVGZOMvkSvYlyT9C8rOkHDpYOHXre2G7B2K9z9AvxpcHpjTcS-wYu-bq3BN1vrrHcf8G3Sl9A22TewrvHBWPcTz627xyfQPQI4fGa88wnHTyZf6xjxIkADAZyBeIReNLqN8PrvPUXfz89uTz9n85uLy9PjeWYYJUVWg9FFAxTynJGacCMlISsjtMzFqjRNJTQBtqJ5xXlRai0NrxtmKtrUVJRC0yl6N87dBv_QQ-zUxkYDbasd-D4qWUouBGPyn04hiqLipWDJ-faJc-374NIaSnBKieCpTpEcTSb4GNPiahvsRodB5UTts1NrtY9I7SNS--zUn-zULqEfR_TRtjD8N6eOrxbL9Er8m5Ffx86HA18QIaUQZdKzUbexg91B1-FecUEFU3dfLhSfX598_bE8V3f0N4mquMk</recordid><startdate>201010</startdate><enddate>201010</enddate><creator>Kelly, Nathan J.</creator><creator>Enns, Peter K.</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Inc</general><general>Wiley Subscription Services</general><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201010</creationdate><title>Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self-Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences</title><author>Kelly, Nathan J. ; Enns, Peter K.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c5302-beca2fe3e1150b06c8800dc7a817d4cf97a0e5d3196624aa8c6bf5c93fb3747a3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2010</creationdate><topic>Conservatism</topic><topic>Cross-sectional analysis</topic><topic>Democracy</topic><topic>Economic activity</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Economic policy</topic><topic>Elites</topic><topic>Government policy</topic><topic>Income distribution</topic><topic>Income Inequality</topic><topic>Income redistribution</topic><topic>Inequality</topic><topic>Liberalism</topic><topic>Modeling</topic><topic>Policy making</topic><topic>Political Economy</topic><topic>Politicians</topic><topic>Preferences</topic><topic>Public Opinion</topic><topic>Public Policy</topic><topic>Representation</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Kelly, Nathan J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Enns, Peter K.</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>American journal of political science</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Kelly, Nathan J.</au><au>Enns, Peter K.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self-Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences</atitle><jtitle>American journal of political science</jtitle><date>2010-10</date><risdate>2010</risdate><volume>54</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>855</spage><epage>870</epage><pages>855-870</pages><issn>0092-5853</issn><eissn>1540-5907</eissn><coden>AJPLB4</coden><abstract>This article assesses the influence of income inequality on the public's policy mood. 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subjects | Conservatism Cross-sectional analysis Democracy Economic activity Economic models Economic policy Elites Government policy Income distribution Income Inequality Income redistribution Inequality Liberalism Modeling Policy making Political Economy Politicians Preferences Public Opinion Public Policy Representation |
title | Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self-Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences |
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