The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
We review recent literature on the role of financial reporting transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers, directors, and shareholders, as well as in reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and offer researchers some suggested avenues for future...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of accounting & economics 2010-12, Vol.50 (2), p.179-234 |
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| container_end_page | 234 |
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| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 179 |
| container_title | Journal of accounting & economics |
| container_volume | 50 |
| creator | Armstrong, Christopher S. Guay, Wayne R. Weber, Joseph P. |
| description | We review recent literature on the role of financial reporting transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers, directors, and shareholders, as well as in reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and offer researchers some suggested avenues for future research. Key themes include the endogenous nature of debt contracts and governance mechanisms with respect to information asymmetry between contracting parties, the heterogeneous nature of the informational demands of contracting parties, and the heterogeneous nature of the resulting governance and debt contracts. We also emphasize the role of a commitment to financial reporting transparency in facilitating informal multiperiod contracts among managers, directors, shareholders, and creditors. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0165-4101 |
| ispartof | Journal of accounting & economics, 2010-12, Vol.50 (2), p.179-234 |
| issn | 0165-4101 1879-1980 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_847098334 |
| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete |
| subjects | Accounting methods Accounting standards Agency theory Board structure Conflicts Corporate debt Corporate finance Corporate governance Debt contracts Executive compensation Financial accounting Financial accounting Corporate governance Board structure Executive compensation Debt contracts Informal contracts Financial regulation Financial reporting Informal contracts Senior management Stockholders Studies U.S.A |
| title | The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting |
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