Separating Small and Big Fish: The Case of Income Tax Evasion
This paper proposes to offer the taxpayer a choice of tax-enforcement schemes for self-selection. More specifically, the taxpayer should have the possibility of opting for the prevailing regime with a certain penalty on the evaded tax or for an alternative regime with a higher penalty on the evaded...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria) Austria), 1991-01, Vol.54 (1), p.55-67 |
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| container_title | Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria) |
| container_volume | 54 |
| creator | Falkinger, Josef Walther, Herbert |
| description | This paper proposes to offer the taxpayer a choice of tax-enforcement schemes for self-selection. More specifically, the taxpayer should have the possibility of opting for the prevailing regime with a certain penalty on the evaded tax or for an alternative regime with a higher penalty on the evaded tax but a reduced tax rate. It is shown that this leads to a separation of taxpayers characterized by a relatively high degree of evasion (H-evaders) from taxpayers who evade only a relatively small amount of tax (L-evaders). Furthermore, the procedure is not self-defeating, it is effectively possible to direct the efforts of auditing towards the H-evaders. At the end of the game the L-evaders experience a welfare gain, the H-evaders are induced to reduce their evasion activities and the government can expect higher yields. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/BF01227455 |
| format | Article |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0931-8658 |
| ispartof | Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria), 1991-01, Vol.54 (1), p.55-67 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Auditing procedures Corporate taxes Income tax Income taxes Optimal taxation Public economics Tax audits Tax evasion Tax policy Tax reduction Taxpaying |
| title | Separating Small and Big Fish: The Case of Income Tax Evasion |
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