Risk weights, risk-based capital and deposit insurance

The thrift risk-based capital regulation assigns weights to various asset categories according to their perceived credit risk. The risk-based capital requirement is 8% of these risk-weighted assets. Little empirical work exists to support either the 8% capital level or the weights included in the re...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of banking & finance 1991-09, Vol.15 (4), p.875-893
Hauptverfasser: Bradley, Michael G., Wambeke, Carol A., Whidbee, David A.
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container_issue 4
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container_title Journal of banking & finance
container_volume 15
creator Bradley, Michael G.
Wambeke, Carol A.
Whidbee, David A.
description The thrift risk-based capital regulation assigns weights to various asset categories according to their perceived credit risk. The risk-based capital requirement is 8% of these risk-weighted assets. Little empirical work exists to support either the 8% capital level or the weights included in the regulation. We employ the asset categories set forth in the regulation to calculate statistical estimates of the capital level and the risk weights that would have been required for the deposit insurance system for thrifts to have been actuarially fair over the 1985–1988 period. Our results indicate that the 8% capital requirement adopted by federal regulators would have been too little to cover insurance costs over the 1985–1988 period and that the risk weights assigned to some asset categories would have been too high relative to the risk weight assigned ‘standard’ assets.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/0378-4266(91)90104-T
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source ScienceDirect; RePEc; Periodicals Index Online
subjects Bank failures
Capital
Capital requirements
Comparative studies
Deposit insurance
Economic models
Regression analysis
Regulatory reform
Risk
Savings & loan associations
title Risk weights, risk-based capital and deposit insurance
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