Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule
The development of social choice theory over the past three decades has brought many new insights into democratic theory. Surprisingly, the theory of representation has gone almost untouched by social choice theorists. This article redresses this neglect and provides an axiomatic study of one means...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The American political science review 1983-09, Vol.77 (3), p.718-733 |
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| container_title | The American political science review |
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| creator | Chamberlin, John R. Courant, Paul N. |
| description | The development of social choice theory over the past three decades has brought many new insights into democratic theory. Surprisingly, the theory of representation has gone almost untouched by social choice theorists. This article redresses this neglect and provides an axiomatic study of one means of implementing proportional representation. The distinguishing feature of proportional representation is its concern for the representativeness of deliberations as well as decisions. We define a representative in a way that is particularly attentive to this feature and then define a method of selecting representatives (a variant of the Borda rule) which selects a maximally representative body. We also prove that this method of selection meets four social choice axioms that are met by a number of other important social choice functions (including pairwise majority decision and the Borda rule). |
| doi_str_mv | 10.2307/1957270 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | The American political science review, 1983-09, Vol.77 (3), p.718-733 |
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Periodicals Index Online; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | CHOICE, IN ANY CONTEXT Committees Constituents Decision making DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND INSTITUTIONS Direct democracy Judgment Majority voting Mathematical functions Political candidates PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION Representation Representatives Social choice THEORY BUILDING OR THEORETICAL APPROACH Voting |
| title | Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule |
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