Incentives, Targeting, and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-executive Stock Options
We examine whether options granted to non-executive employees affect firm performance. Using new data on option programs, we explore the link between broad-based option programs, option portfolio implied incentives, and firm operating performance, utilizing an instrumental variables approach to iden...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | The Review of financial studies 2010-11, Vol.23 (11), p.4148-4186 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 4186 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 11 |
| container_start_page | 4148 |
| container_title | The Review of financial studies |
| container_volume | 23 |
| creator | Hochberg, Yael V. Lindsey, Laura |
| description | We examine whether options granted to non-executive employees affect firm performance. Using new data on option programs, we explore the link between broad-based option programs, option portfolio implied incentives, and firm operating performance, utilizing an instrumental variables approach to identify causal effects. Firms whose employee option portfolios have higher implied incentives exhibit higher subsequent operating performance. Intuitively, the implied incentive-performance relation is concentrated in firms with fewer employees and in firms with higher growth opportunities. Additionally, the effect is concentrated in firms that grant options broadly to non-executive employees, consistent with theories of cooperation and mutual monitoring among co-workers. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/rfs/hhq093 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_839141410</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>40961310</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>40961310</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c477t-1a38fe5dcf73c93b5bc481de98ca047c456b2fbe34e3675d57770a697b4bde763</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpd0EFLwzAUB_AgCs7pxbsQvAiyumRJk8bbGE4HwwlOPJY0TbbOLplJK-7bm1HxIAkkh997j_cH4BKjO4wEGXoThuv1Z_wegR6mLE04Ydkx6KFMkETQlJ6CsxA2CCFMKOqB95lV2jbVlw4DuJR-pZvKrgZQ2hJOK7-FL9ob57cysns4tvHKeh-qAJ2Bz84m-lur9lAPXxunPuBi11TOhnNwYmQd9MXv2wdv04fl5CmZLx5nk_E8UZTzJsGSZEanpTKcKEGKtFA0w6UWmZKIckVTVoxMoQnVhPG0TDnnSDLBC1qUmjPSBzdd3513n60OTb6tgtJ1La12bcgzIjCNB0V5_U9uXOvjNiHnbEQZYRRHdNsh5V0IXpt856ut9Psco_yQcB4TzruEI77q8CY0zv9JigTDJE78AQxEeLo</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>762463641</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Incentives, Targeting, and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-executive Stock Options</title><source>Business Source Complete</source><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><source>Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current)</source><creator>Hochberg, Yael V. ; Lindsey, Laura</creator><creatorcontrib>Hochberg, Yael V. ; Lindsey, Laura</creatorcontrib><description>We examine whether options granted to non-executive employees affect firm performance. Using new data on option programs, we explore the link between broad-based option programs, option portfolio implied incentives, and firm operating performance, utilizing an instrumental variables approach to identify causal effects. Firms whose employee option portfolios have higher implied incentives exhibit higher subsequent operating performance. Intuitively, the implied incentive-performance relation is concentrated in firms with fewer employees and in firms with higher growth opportunities. Additionally, the effect is concentrated in firms that grant options broadly to non-executive employees, consistent with theories of cooperation and mutual monitoring among co-workers.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0893-9454</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1465-7368</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhq093</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford: Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>Business management ; Business structures ; Cash flow ; Causality ; Coefficients ; Correlation analysis ; Employee motivation ; Employees ; Enterprises ; Finance ; Incentive plans ; Incentive stock options ; Incentives ; Instrumental variables estimation ; Musical performance ; Options on stocks ; Senior management ; Stock options ; Stock prices ; Studies</subject><ispartof>The Review of financial studies, 2010-11, Vol.23 (11), p.4148-4186</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2010 The Society for Financial Studies</rights><rights>Copyright Oxford Publishing Limited(England) Nov 2010</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c477t-1a38fe5dcf73c93b5bc481de98ca047c456b2fbe34e3675d57770a697b4bde763</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c477t-1a38fe5dcf73c93b5bc481de98ca047c456b2fbe34e3675d57770a697b4bde763</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40961310$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/40961310$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,27923,27924,58016,58249</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Hochberg, Yael V.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lindsey, Laura</creatorcontrib><title>Incentives, Targeting, and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-executive Stock Options</title><title>The Review of financial studies</title><description>We examine whether options granted to non-executive employees affect firm performance. Using new data on option programs, we explore the link between broad-based option programs, option portfolio implied incentives, and firm operating performance, utilizing an instrumental variables approach to identify causal effects. Firms whose employee option portfolios have higher implied incentives exhibit higher subsequent operating performance. Intuitively, the implied incentive-performance relation is concentrated in firms with fewer employees and in firms with higher growth opportunities. Additionally, the effect is concentrated in firms that grant options broadly to non-executive employees, consistent with theories of cooperation and mutual monitoring among co-workers.</description><subject>Business management</subject><subject>Business structures</subject><subject>Cash flow</subject><subject>Causality</subject><subject>Coefficients</subject><subject>Correlation analysis</subject><subject>Employee motivation</subject><subject>Employees</subject><subject>Enterprises</subject><subject>Finance</subject><subject>Incentive plans</subject><subject>Incentive stock options</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><subject>Instrumental variables estimation</subject><subject>Musical performance</subject><subject>Options on stocks</subject><subject>Senior management</subject><subject>Stock options</subject><subject>Stock prices</subject><subject>Studies</subject><issn>0893-9454</issn><issn>1465-7368</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2010</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpd0EFLwzAUB_AgCs7pxbsQvAiyumRJk8bbGE4HwwlOPJY0TbbOLplJK-7bm1HxIAkkh997j_cH4BKjO4wEGXoThuv1Z_wegR6mLE04Ydkx6KFMkETQlJ6CsxA2CCFMKOqB95lV2jbVlw4DuJR-pZvKrgZQ2hJOK7-FL9ob57cysns4tvHKeh-qAJ2Bz84m-lur9lAPXxunPuBi11TOhnNwYmQd9MXv2wdv04fl5CmZLx5nk_E8UZTzJsGSZEanpTKcKEGKtFA0w6UWmZKIckVTVoxMoQnVhPG0TDnnSDLBC1qUmjPSBzdd3513n60OTb6tgtJ1La12bcgzIjCNB0V5_U9uXOvjNiHnbEQZYRRHdNsh5V0IXpt856ut9Psco_yQcB4TzruEI77q8CY0zv9JigTDJE78AQxEeLo</recordid><startdate>20101101</startdate><enddate>20101101</enddate><creator>Hochberg, Yael V.</creator><creator>Lindsey, Laura</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><general>Oxford Publishing Limited (England)</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20101101</creationdate><title>Incentives, Targeting, and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-executive Stock Options</title><author>Hochberg, Yael V. ; Lindsey, Laura</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c477t-1a38fe5dcf73c93b5bc481de98ca047c456b2fbe34e3675d57770a697b4bde763</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2010</creationdate><topic>Business management</topic><topic>Business structures</topic><topic>Cash flow</topic><topic>Causality</topic><topic>Coefficients</topic><topic>Correlation analysis</topic><topic>Employee motivation</topic><topic>Employees</topic><topic>Enterprises</topic><topic>Finance</topic><topic>Incentive plans</topic><topic>Incentive stock options</topic><topic>Incentives</topic><topic>Instrumental variables estimation</topic><topic>Musical performance</topic><topic>Options on stocks</topic><topic>Senior management</topic><topic>Stock options</topic><topic>Stock prices</topic><topic>Studies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Hochberg, Yael V.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lindsey, Laura</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>The Review of financial studies</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Hochberg, Yael V.</au><au>Lindsey, Laura</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Incentives, Targeting, and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-executive Stock Options</atitle><jtitle>The Review of financial studies</jtitle><date>2010-11-01</date><risdate>2010</risdate><volume>23</volume><issue>11</issue><spage>4148</spage><epage>4186</epage><pages>4148-4186</pages><issn>0893-9454</issn><eissn>1465-7368</eissn><abstract>We examine whether options granted to non-executive employees affect firm performance. Using new data on option programs, we explore the link between broad-based option programs, option portfolio implied incentives, and firm operating performance, utilizing an instrumental variables approach to identify causal effects. Firms whose employee option portfolios have higher implied incentives exhibit higher subsequent operating performance. Intuitively, the implied incentive-performance relation is concentrated in firms with fewer employees and in firms with higher growth opportunities. Additionally, the effect is concentrated in firms that grant options broadly to non-executive employees, consistent with theories of cooperation and mutual monitoring among co-workers.</abstract><cop>Oxford</cop><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><doi>10.1093/rfs/hhq093</doi><tpages>39</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0893-9454 |
| ispartof | The Review of financial studies, 2010-11, Vol.23 (11), p.4148-4186 |
| issn | 0893-9454 1465-7368 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_839141410 |
| source | Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current) |
| subjects | Business management Business structures Cash flow Causality Coefficients Correlation analysis Employee motivation Employees Enterprises Finance Incentive plans Incentive stock options Incentives Instrumental variables estimation Musical performance Options on stocks Senior management Stock options Stock prices Studies |
| title | Incentives, Targeting, and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-executive Stock Options |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-08T23%3A15%3A26IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Incentives,%20Targeting,%20and%20Firm%20Performance:%20An%20Analysis%20of%20Non-executive%20Stock%20Options&rft.jtitle=The%20Review%20of%20financial%20studies&rft.au=Hochberg,%20Yael%20V.&rft.date=2010-11-01&rft.volume=23&rft.issue=11&rft.spage=4148&rft.epage=4186&rft.pages=4148-4186&rft.issn=0893-9454&rft.eissn=1465-7368&rft_id=info:doi/10.1093/rfs/hhq093&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E40961310%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=762463641&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=40961310&rfr_iscdi=true |