IS AN EXPORT SUBSIDY A ROBUST TRADE POLICY RECOMMENDATION TOWARD A UNIONIZED DUOPOLY?
Brander and Spencer (1988) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2000) imply that the robust trade policy recommendation toward a unionized duopoly is an export subsidy. In this paper, we show that we cannot get such a result even in the linear case if the opportunity cost of public funds is sufficiently high....
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Economics and politics 2008-06, Vol.20 (2), p.141-155 |
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| creator | MA, JIE |
| description | Brander and Spencer (1988) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2000) imply that the robust trade policy recommendation toward a unionized duopoly is an export subsidy. In this paper, we show that we cannot get such a result even in the linear case if the opportunity cost of public funds is sufficiently high. However, if we consider the case where the domestic firm and the trade union lobby the government to set favorable trade policies by giving the government political contributions, then the result of robustness will be restored if the government cares about political contributions sufficiently relative to national welfare. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00326.x |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Economics and politics, 2008-06, Vol.20 (2), p.141-155 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; Political Science Complete |
| subjects | Duopoly Economic behaviour Exports Exports and Imports Government policy Imperfect competition Interventionism Labor unions Linear models Lobbying Oligopolies Opportunity costs Political behavior Political economy Politics Subsidies Trade Policy Unions Welfare policy |
| title | IS AN EXPORT SUBSIDY A ROBUST TRADE POLICY RECOMMENDATION TOWARD A UNIONIZED DUOPOLY? |
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