The Owner–Manager Conflict in Insured Banks: Predetermined Salary versus Bonus Payments

A study examines the incentives of a bank's owners and manager to increase the level of assets risk if bank deposits are insured. The model consists of 3 players: a public insurer, the bank's owners, and its manager. In the model, the form of compensation to the manager plays a crucial rol...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of financial services research 1997-10, Vol.12 (2), p.303-326
1. Verfasser:	Schreiber, Ben
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bank assets Banking systems Deposit insurance Financial crisis Incentives Managers Owners Pareto optimum Risk Risk management Studies Wages & salaries
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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