Strategic forward contracting and observability

Recently, Allaz (1992) characterized strategic and hedging incentives for entering forward contracts in a two-stage duopoly setting under the implicit assumption that positions in forward contracts are publicly observable. However, credible disclosure of such positions is, at best, costly and subjec...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	International journal of industrial organization 1997-11, Vol.16 (1), p.121-133
Hauptverfasser:	Hughes, John S., Kao, Jennifer L.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Business strategies Commitment Contracts Duopoly Forward contracts Forward exchange contracts Hedging Industrial organization Observability Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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