On Time Inconsistency: A Technical Issue in Stackelberg Differential Games
Stackelberg differential games are useful settings in which optimal government policies can be studied. This paper argues that the analysis of these games involves a key technical issue. In particular, we question the necessity for optimality of one boundary condition invoked in existing literature....
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic theory 1997-10, Vol.76 (2), p.412-430 |
|---|---|
| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 430 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 412 |
| container_title | Journal of economic theory |
| container_volume | 76 |
| creator | Xie, Danyang |
| description | Stackelberg differential games are useful settings in which optimal government policies can be studied. This paper argues that the analysis of these games involves a key technical issue. In particular, we question the necessity for optimality of one boundary condition invoked in existing literature. The issue is of key interest because the boundary condition is largely responsible for the time inconsistency results previously obtained. We show that the boundary condition is not necessary in some cases. As a result, our finding undermines the credibility of the existing conclusions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C61, E62, H21. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1006/jeth.1997.2308 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_839084168</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S0022053197923085</els_id><sourcerecordid>839084168</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c474t-bd4744c915cb26889aa17143d08b7f543a07b67951a909e9eae2b271a860b5583</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp1kTFv2zAQhYmgAeI6XTsLXTrJOZKiSHYL0jRxEMBDnJmg6FNNV6JcUg7gf18qLjIEyPB4y_ceD-8I-UphQQHqqx2O2wXVWi4YB3VGZhS0KCXj4hOZATBWguD0gnxOaQdAqajrGXlYhWLteyyWwQ0h-TRicMcfxXWxRrcN3tmuWKZ0wMKH4mm07g92DcbfxU_fthgxjD4Td7bHdEnOW9sl_PJ_zsnzr9v1zX35uLpb3lw_lq6S1Vg2mzwqp6lwDauV0tZSSSu-AdXIVlTcgmxqqQW1GjRqtMgaJqlVNTRCKD4n30-5-zj8PWAaTe-Tw66zAYdDMoprUBWtJ_LbO3I3HGLIyxmWf1RKCJ2hxQlycUgpYmv20fc2Hg0FMxVrpmLNVKyZis2Gh5Mh4h7dG42IE4iDeTHcyjo_x6xXH7c-i2XtsyrKTMXBbMc-h6lTGObGXjxGk5zPJ8CNj-hGsxn8R3v8A7c8ljU</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>214388559</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>On Time Inconsistency: A Technical Issue in Stackelberg Differential Games</title><source>RePEc</source><source>Access via ScienceDirect (Elsevier)</source><creator>Xie, Danyang</creator><creatorcontrib>Xie, Danyang</creatorcontrib><description>Stackelberg differential games are useful settings in which optimal government policies can be studied. This paper argues that the analysis of these games involves a key technical issue. In particular, we question the necessity for optimality of one boundary condition invoked in existing literature. The issue is of key interest because the boundary condition is largely responsible for the time inconsistency results previously obtained. We show that the boundary condition is not necessary in some cases. As a result, our finding undermines the credibility of the existing conclusions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C61, E62, H21.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-0531</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1095-7235</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2308</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JECTAQ</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: Elsevier Inc</publisher><subject>Economic models ; Economic theory ; Game theory ; Government policy ; Optimization ; Studies ; Time</subject><ispartof>Journal of economic theory, 1997-10, Vol.76 (2), p.412-430</ispartof><rights>1997 Academic Press</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc. Oct 1997</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c474t-bd4744c915cb26889aa17143d08b7f543a07b67951a909e9eae2b271a860b5583</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c474t-bd4744c915cb26889aa17143d08b7f543a07b67951a909e9eae2b271a860b5583</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2308$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>315,781,785,3551,4009,27926,27927,45997</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejetheo/v_3a76_3ay_3a1997_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a412-430.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Xie, Danyang</creatorcontrib><title>On Time Inconsistency: A Technical Issue in Stackelberg Differential Games</title><title>Journal of economic theory</title><description>Stackelberg differential games are useful settings in which optimal government policies can be studied. This paper argues that the analysis of these games involves a key technical issue. In particular, we question the necessity for optimality of one boundary condition invoked in existing literature. The issue is of key interest because the boundary condition is largely responsible for the time inconsistency results previously obtained. We show that the boundary condition is not necessary in some cases. As a result, our finding undermines the credibility of the existing conclusions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C61, E62, H21.</description><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Government policy</subject><subject>Optimization</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Time</subject><issn>0022-0531</issn><issn>1095-7235</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1997</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>X2L</sourceid><recordid>eNp1kTFv2zAQhYmgAeI6XTsLXTrJOZKiSHYL0jRxEMBDnJmg6FNNV6JcUg7gf18qLjIEyPB4y_ceD-8I-UphQQHqqx2O2wXVWi4YB3VGZhS0KCXj4hOZATBWguD0gnxOaQdAqajrGXlYhWLteyyWwQ0h-TRicMcfxXWxRrcN3tmuWKZ0wMKH4mm07g92DcbfxU_fthgxjD4Td7bHdEnOW9sl_PJ_zsnzr9v1zX35uLpb3lw_lq6S1Vg2mzwqp6lwDauV0tZSSSu-AdXIVlTcgmxqqQW1GjRqtMgaJqlVNTRCKD4n30-5-zj8PWAaTe-Tw66zAYdDMoprUBWtJ_LbO3I3HGLIyxmWf1RKCJ2hxQlycUgpYmv20fc2Hg0FMxVrpmLNVKyZis2Gh5Mh4h7dG42IE4iDeTHcyjo_x6xXH7c-i2XtsyrKTMXBbMc-h6lTGObGXjxGk5zPJ8CNj-hGsxn8R3v8A7c8ljU</recordid><startdate>19971001</startdate><enddate>19971001</enddate><creator>Xie, Danyang</creator><general>Elsevier Inc</general><general>Elsevier</general><general>Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc</general><scope>DKI</scope><scope>X2L</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>19971001</creationdate><title>On Time Inconsistency: A Technical Issue in Stackelberg Differential Games</title><author>Xie, Danyang</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c474t-bd4744c915cb26889aa17143d08b7f543a07b67951a909e9eae2b271a860b5583</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1997</creationdate><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Government policy</topic><topic>Optimization</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Time</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Xie, Danyang</creatorcontrib><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of economic theory</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Xie, Danyang</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>On Time Inconsistency: A Technical Issue in Stackelberg Differential Games</atitle><jtitle>Journal of economic theory</jtitle><date>1997-10-01</date><risdate>1997</risdate><volume>76</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>412</spage><epage>430</epage><pages>412-430</pages><issn>0022-0531</issn><eissn>1095-7235</eissn><coden>JECTAQ</coden><abstract>Stackelberg differential games are useful settings in which optimal government policies can be studied. This paper argues that the analysis of these games involves a key technical issue. In particular, we question the necessity for optimality of one boundary condition invoked in existing literature. The issue is of key interest because the boundary condition is largely responsible for the time inconsistency results previously obtained. We show that the boundary condition is not necessary in some cases. As a result, our finding undermines the credibility of the existing conclusions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C61, E62, H21.</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>Elsevier Inc</pub><doi>10.1006/jeth.1997.2308</doi><tpages>19</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0022-0531 |
| ispartof | Journal of economic theory, 1997-10, Vol.76 (2), p.412-430 |
| issn | 0022-0531 1095-7235 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_839084168 |
| source | RePEc; Access via ScienceDirect (Elsevier) |
| subjects | Economic models Economic theory Game theory Government policy Optimization Studies Time |
| title | On Time Inconsistency: A Technical Issue in Stackelberg Differential Games |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-18T07%3A34%3A28IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=On%20Time%20Inconsistency:%20A%20Technical%20Issue%20in%20Stackelberg%20Differential%20Games&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20economic%20theory&rft.au=Xie,%20Danyang&rft.date=1997-10-01&rft.volume=76&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=412&rft.epage=430&rft.pages=412-430&rft.issn=0022-0531&rft.eissn=1095-7235&rft.coden=JECTAQ&rft_id=info:doi/10.1006/jeth.1997.2308&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E839084168%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=214388559&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_els_id=S0022053197923085&rfr_iscdi=true |