The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation

Is cooperation without central authority stable? If so, how robust is it? Despite what might be the conventional wisdom, The Evolution of Cooperation did not solve this problem deductively. In fact, results obtained later by others seem to have contradicted the book's main message. Reexamining...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The American political science review 1997-06, Vol.91 (2), p.290-307
Hauptverfasser:	Bendor, Jonathan, Swistak, Piotr
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Analysis Basic Skills Beliefs, opinions and attitudes Co-operation Cooperation Ecological balance Ecological competition Ecological genetics Ecological invasion Efficient strategies Equilibrium Evolution Evolutionary games Game theory GAME THEORY AND DECISION THEORY IN MODELS Institutionalized Persons Political Science Political stability POLITICAL SYSTEM AS A WHOLE Politics Population Repeated games Social evolution STABILITY OR INSTABILITY
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