Choosing Free Trade without Amending the U.S. Constitution

This paper documents the functioning of the market in trade protection. It uses a narrative approach to demonstrate that politicians respond to the demands of special interests by forcing open foreign markets and by closing domestic markets. In the process government officials violate property right...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective 1997-03, Vol.90 (1/4), p.185-200
1. Verfasser:	Thorbecke, Willem
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	AMENDMENTS & THE POWER TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S Auto Part Automobile dealers Campaign contributions CHOICE, IN ANY CONTEXT Constitution Constitution-US CONSTITUTIONS Consumer economics Consumers Costs Foreign cars Free Trade International trade Luxury automobiles Political economy Politicians Politics Presidents Property rights Protectionism Public choice Public interest Rent seeking behavior Tariffs Trade Protection Trade protections U.S.A United States UNITED STATES, 1945 TO PRESENT Wall Street Wall Street Journal World Trade Organization
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