Public Choice in a Federal System

Except for the mobility constraints imposed on political decisions of lower-level governments, public choice analysts assume that the working of the political process under federalism remains the same at all levels of governments as under unitary state. This paper argues that one dimension of the po...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective 1997-03, Vol.90 (1/4), p.235-254
1. Verfasser:	MIGUE, JEAN-LUC
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Canada (Quebec) Central Government Competition Constitution Economic analysis Economic competition Economic resources Economic theory Federal System Federalism Government Jurisdiction Monopoly National politics Political economy Political Market Politicians Politics Private Market Property rights Provincial government Public Choice Public Opinion Suppliers Supply Voters Voting
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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