Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance, Incentive Compatible Regulations, and Bank Asset Choices
This article provides incentive compatible regulations that support feirly priced deposit insurance in a competitive banking industry. If informational asymmetry exists between the regulator and banks regarding loan quality, but the regulator can observe actual loan rates charged, then imposing a ca...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory 1996-06, Vol.21 (1), p.123-141 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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