Strategic Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence and the Exchange Rate: A Game Theoretic Analysis
Strategic Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence is modeled using a game theoretic framework. The model distinguishes between the European Community, the United States and a politically passive rest-of-the-world. Particular emphasis is placed on the effect of the exchange rate on the equilibrium...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 1996-07, Vol.88 (1/2), p.43-56 |
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| container_title | Public choice |
| container_volume | 88 |
| creator | Kennedy, P. Lynn Von Witzke, Harald Roe, Terry L. |
| description | Strategic Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence is modeled using a game theoretic framework. The model distinguishes between the European Community, the United States and a politically passive rest-of-the-world. Particular emphasis is placed on the effect of the exchange rate on the equilibrium outcome of this game. Without compensatory payments to those with the highest political influence, the results suggest that only modest reform is possible. With compensation, liberalization occurs but free trade is not obtained. Simulations also indicate that the U.S. gains incentive to reduce protection given a depreciation of the dollar, while incentive to liberalize trade policies decreases as the dollar appreciates. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/BF00130408 |
| format | Article |
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Simulations also indicate that the U.S. gains incentive to reduce protection given a depreciation of the dollar, while incentive to liberalize trade policies decreases as the dollar appreciates.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0048-5829</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1573-7101</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/BF00130408</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Leiden: Kluwer Academic Publishers</publisher><subject>Agricultural trade ; Agriculture ; Budget policy ; Commodities ; Common Agricultural Policy ; Consumption ; Crop economics ; Demand curves ; Endowment ; EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ; Exchange rates ; Expenditures ; Exports ; Farm exports ; Financial budgets ; Foreign exchange rates ; Game Theory ; GAME THEORY AND DECISION THEORY IN MODELS ; Government budgets ; International agreements ; International Trade ; Liberalization ; Market prices ; MODELING, MODELS ; Nash equilibrium ; Policymaking ; PUBLIC POLICY ; REFORM, REFORMERS ; Strategy ; Subsidies ; Trade policy ; UNITED STATES, 1945 TO PRESENT</subject><ispartof>Public choice, 1996-07, Vol.88 (1/2), p.43-56</ispartof><rights>Copyright 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers</rights><rights>Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers Jul 1996</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c441t-ae7377f2e25d919debb4433066628fe18f65d72732984c939711216995c2467c3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c441t-ae7377f2e25d919debb4433066628fe18f65d72732984c939711216995c2467c3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/30027251$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/30027251$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,27924,27925,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Kennedy, P. 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| ispartof | Public choice, 1996-07, Vol.88 (1/2), p.43-56 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SpringerNature Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; Jstor Complete Legacy; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete |
| subjects | Agricultural trade Agriculture Budget policy Commodities Common Agricultural Policy Consumption Crop economics Demand curves Endowment EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Exchange rates Expenditures Exports Farm exports Financial budgets Foreign exchange rates Game Theory GAME THEORY AND DECISION THEORY IN MODELS Government budgets International agreements International Trade Liberalization Market prices MODELING, MODELS Nash equilibrium Policymaking PUBLIC POLICY REFORM, REFORMERS Strategy Subsidies Trade policy UNITED STATES, 1945 TO PRESENT |
| title | Strategic Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence and the Exchange Rate: A Game Theoretic Analysis |
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