On Pareto-improving voluntary export restraints

This paper develops the argument that binding voluntary export restraints (VERs) may raise the profits of all firms and the welfare of all trading partners. This possibility is shown to arise in a model of Cournot oligopoly and is consistent with the theory of the second best. VERs benefit unconstra...

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Veröffentlicht in:	International journal of industrial organization 1996-01, Vol.14 (1), p.71-84
1. Verfasser:	Syropoulos, Constantinos
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Consumer surplus Exports Imperfect competition Pareto-improvement VERs Welfare
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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