High and Low Trusters' Responses to Fear in a Payoff Matrix
Interpersonal trust has long been known to influence cooperation. This study tested the hypothesis that one's degree of trust in others will influence the extent to which one reacts to the presence of fear (or the possibility of receiving no payoff for cooperative actions) in a payoff matrix. T...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of conflict resolution 1995-12, Vol.39 (4), p.718-730 |
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| container_title | The Journal of conflict resolution |
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| creator | Parks, Craig D. Hulbert, Lorne G. |
| description | Interpersonal trust has long been known to influence cooperation. This study tested the hypothesis that one's degree of trust in others will influence the extent to which one reacts to the presence of fear (or the possibility of receiving no payoff for cooperative actions) in a payoff matrix. The hypothesis was formally tested with public goods games and resource dilemma games, with fear manipulated. Results support the hypothesis: when fear was present, high trusters cooperated more frequently than low trusters; when absent, high and low trusters cooperated at the same rate. The findings held across both games. However, the effects of fear within each game were not straightforward: removing fear from the resource dilemma increased low trusters' cooperation rates, but removing fear from the public goods game decreased high trusters' cooperation rates. Results imply that discussion of the role of trust in cooperation must consider whether the particular dilemma contains an element of fear. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1177/0022002795039004006 |
| format | Article |
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This study tested the hypothesis that one's degree of trust in others will influence the extent to which one reacts to the presence of fear (or the possibility of receiving no payoff for cooperative actions) in a payoff matrix. The hypothesis was formally tested with public goods games and resource dilemma games, with fear manipulated. Results support the hypothesis: when fear was present, high trusters cooperated more frequently than low trusters; when absent, high and low trusters cooperated at the same rate. The findings held across both games. However, the effects of fear within each game were not straightforward: removing fear from the resource dilemma increased low trusters' cooperation rates, but removing fear from the public goods game decreased high trusters' cooperation rates. Results imply that discussion of the role of trust in cooperation must consider whether the particular dilemma contains an element of fear.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-0027</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1552-8766</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1177/0022002795039004006</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JCFRAL</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, CA 91320: Sage Publications</publisher><subject>Behavior ; Conflict Resolution ; Cooperation ; Dilemmas ; Economic resources ; Experimentation ; Fear ; Fear & phobias ; Game Theory ; Games ; Group dynamics ; Group Unity ; Higher Education ; Interpersonal Relations ; Payoff matrix ; Personality psychology ; Prisoner's Dilemma ; Public goods ; Questionnaires ; Social co-operation ; Social psychology ; Social research ; Social Theories ; Trust ; Trust (Psychology)</subject><ispartof>The Journal of conflict resolution, 1995-12, Vol.39 (4), p.718-730</ispartof><rights>Copyright 1995 Sage Publications, Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC. Dec 1995</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c577t-3903ab0cb8c8113b76bebf0d99b68a8baffa9c970b9fb4b8fe4fdfa81fecd4ee3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c577t-3903ab0cb8c8113b76bebf0d99b68a8baffa9c970b9fb4b8fe4fdfa81fecd4ee3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/174384$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/174384$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,12824,21798,27846,27901,27902,33752,43597,43598,57992,58225</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/detail?accno=EJ521229$$DView record in ERIC$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Parks, Craig D.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hulbert, Lorne G.</creatorcontrib><title>High and Low Trusters' Responses to Fear in a Payoff Matrix</title><title>The Journal of conflict resolution</title><description>Interpersonal trust has long been known to influence cooperation. This study tested the hypothesis that one's degree of trust in others will influence the extent to which one reacts to the presence of fear (or the possibility of receiving no payoff for cooperative actions) in a payoff matrix. The hypothesis was formally tested with public goods games and resource dilemma games, with fear manipulated. Results support the hypothesis: when fear was present, high trusters cooperated more frequently than low trusters; when absent, high and low trusters cooperated at the same rate. The findings held across both games. However, the effects of fear within each game were not straightforward: removing fear from the resource dilemma increased low trusters' cooperation rates, but removing fear from the public goods game decreased high trusters' cooperation rates. Results imply that discussion of the role of trust in cooperation must consider whether the particular dilemma contains an element of fear.</description><subject>Behavior</subject><subject>Conflict Resolution</subject><subject>Cooperation</subject><subject>Dilemmas</subject><subject>Economic resources</subject><subject>Experimentation</subject><subject>Fear</subject><subject>Fear & phobias</subject><subject>Game Theory</subject><subject>Games</subject><subject>Group dynamics</subject><subject>Group Unity</subject><subject>Higher Education</subject><subject>Interpersonal Relations</subject><subject>Payoff matrix</subject><subject>Personality psychology</subject><subject>Prisoner's Dilemma</subject><subject>Public goods</subject><subject>Questionnaires</subject><subject>Social co-operation</subject><subject>Social psychology</subject><subject>Social research</subject><subject>Social Theories</subject><subject>Trust</subject><subject>Trust 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This study tested the hypothesis that one's degree of trust in others will influence the extent to which one reacts to the presence of fear (or the possibility of receiving no payoff for cooperative actions) in a payoff matrix. The hypothesis was formally tested with public goods games and resource dilemma games, with fear manipulated. Results support the hypothesis: when fear was present, high trusters cooperated more frequently than low trusters; when absent, high and low trusters cooperated at the same rate. The findings held across both games. However, the effects of fear within each game were not straightforward: removing fear from the resource dilemma increased low trusters' cooperation rates, but removing fear from the public goods game decreased high trusters' cooperation rates. Results imply that discussion of the role of trust in cooperation must consider whether the particular dilemma contains an element of fear.</abstract><cop>2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, CA 91320</cop><pub>Sage Publications</pub><doi>10.1177/0022002795039004006</doi><tpages>13</tpages></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | The Journal of conflict resolution, 1995-12, Vol.39 (4), p.718-730 |
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| source | SAGE Backfile Access; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; JSTOR; Sociological Abstracts; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | Behavior Conflict Resolution Cooperation Dilemmas Economic resources Experimentation Fear Fear & phobias Game Theory Games Group dynamics Group Unity Higher Education Interpersonal Relations Payoff matrix Personality psychology Prisoner's Dilemma Public goods Questionnaires Social co-operation Social psychology Social research Social Theories Trust Trust (Psychology) |
| title | High and Low Trusters' Responses to Fear in a Payoff Matrix |
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