Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria

A group of individuals repeatedly plays a fixed extensive-form game, using past play to forecast future actions. Each (asymptotically) maximizes his own immediate expected payoff, believing that others' play corresponds to the historical frequencies of past play. Because players observe only th...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior 1995, Vol.8 (1), p.20-55
Hauptverfasser:	Fudenberg, Drew, Kreps, David M.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Equilibrium Game theory Learning
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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