The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
We conducted the first randomized controlled field experiment of an Internet reputation mechanism. A high-reputation, established eBay dealer sold matched pairs of lots—batches of vintage postcards—under his regular identity and under new seller identities (also operated by him). As predicted, t...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association 2006-06, Vol.9 (2), p.79-101 |
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creator | Resnick, Paul Zeckhauser, Richard J Lockwood, Kate Swanson, John |
description | We conducted the first randomized controlled field experiment of an Internet reputation mechanism. A high-reputation, established eBay dealer sold matched pairs of lots—batches of vintage postcards—under his regular identity and under new seller identities (also operated by him). As predicted, the established identity fared better. The difference in buyers’ willingness-to-pay was 8.1% of the selling price. A subsidiary experiment followed the same format, but compared sales by relatively new sellers with and without negative feedback. Surprisingly, one or two negative feedbacks for our new sellers did not affect buyers’ willingness-to-pay. Copyright Economic Science Association 2006 |
doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s10683-006-4309-2 |
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subjects | Auctions Business economics Business reputation Data collection EBay Electronic commerce Experimental economics Experiments Field experiment Internet Observational studies Purchasing Reputation Reputation management Reputations Sales Studies Trust Websites Willingness to pay |
title | The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment |
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