Regulatory Administration and Organizational Rigidity
Discussions of regulatory problems have been dominated by Bernstein's theory of regulatory agency decay which contends that agencies become rigid as a result of the chronological aging of the agency. With increased age, agencies lose general political support and become "captured" by...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | The Western political quarterly 1978-03, Vol.31 (1), p.80-95 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 95 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 80 |
| container_title | The Western political quarterly |
| container_volume | 31 |
| creator | Meier, Kenneth J. Plumlee, John P. |
| description | Discussions of regulatory problems have been dominated by Bernstein's theory of regulatory agency decay which contends that agencies become rigid as a result of the chronological aging of the agency. With increased age, agencies lose general political support and become "captured" by the regulated interest. This paper examines the political support, interest relationships, and rigidity of eight regulatory agencies over the entire lifetime of the agency. Contrary to the theory's predictions, as agencies age they do not necessarily lose political support, they do not become more captured by the regulated industry, and they do not become more rigid. The findings suggest the reasons policy-makers normally accept for regulatory agency failure must be reevaluated. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1177/106591297803100108 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_818823294</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>447308</jstor_id><sage_id>10.1177_106591297803100108</sage_id><sourcerecordid>447308</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3268-4f137d1c1d17c3fe7ae9e519b6d9b3e2db3660ec28d31832c3dbf5fc8ae1df143</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqNkV1LwzAUhoMoOKd_wKuCoFd1OTltkl6O4RcMBkOvS9qkJaNrZ9JezF9v5nYxFIZXBw7P-56Pl5BboI8AQkyA8jQDlglJESgFKs_IiCFLY8lFek5GlCYYJ1TIS3Ll_YpSipyzEUmXph4a1XduG0312rbW9071tmsj1epo4WrV2q-fhmqipa2ttv32mlxUqvHm5lDH5OP56X32Gs8XL2-z6TwukXEZJxWg0FCCBlFiZYQymUkhK7jOCjRMF2EJakomNYJEVqIuqrQqpTKgK0hwTB72vhvXfQ7G9_na-tI0jWpNN_hcgpThymxH3p8kOcUkDef_A2SIXEAA736Bq25w4Qs-D48GkckEd3ZsT5Wu896ZKt84u1ZumwPNd9Hkf6MJosle5FVtjmxPKQ7LrHyI6ngGQyryJBEYqG-iopgU</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1291798438</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Regulatory Administration and Organizational Rigidity</title><source>SAGE Complete A-Z List</source><source>Jstor Complete Legacy</source><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>Alma/SFX Local Collection</source><source>Periodicals Index Online</source><creator>Meier, Kenneth J. ; Plumlee, John P.</creator><creatorcontrib>Meier, Kenneth J. ; Plumlee, John P.</creatorcontrib><description>Discussions of regulatory problems have been dominated by Bernstein's theory of regulatory agency decay which contends that agencies become rigid as a result of the chronological aging of the agency. With increased age, agencies lose general political support and become "captured" by the regulated interest. This paper examines the political support, interest relationships, and rigidity of eight regulatory agencies over the entire lifetime of the agency. Contrary to the theory's predictions, as agencies age they do not necessarily lose political support, they do not become more captured by the regulated industry, and they do not become more rigid. The findings suggest the reasons policy-makers normally accept for regulatory agency failure must be reevaluated.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0043-4078</identifier><identifier>ISSN: 1065-9129</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2325-8675</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1938-274X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1177/106591297803100108</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Thousand Oaks, CA: University of Utah</publisher><subject>Administrative agencies ; Administrative law ; Age ; Aviation regulation ; Drug regulation ; Economic regulation ; Indexing in process ; Industrial regulation ; Management ; Regulatory legislation ; Regulatory reform ; Regulatory theory</subject><ispartof>The Western political quarterly, 1978-03, Vol.31 (1), p.80-95</ispartof><rights>Copyright 1978 The University of Utah</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3268-4f137d1c1d17c3fe7ae9e519b6d9b3e2db3660ec28d31832c3dbf5fc8ae1df143</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/447308$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/447308$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,21798,27846,27901,27902,43597,43598,57992,58225</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Meier, Kenneth J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Plumlee, John P.</creatorcontrib><title>Regulatory Administration and Organizational Rigidity</title><title>The Western political quarterly</title><description>Discussions of regulatory problems have been dominated by Bernstein's theory of regulatory agency decay which contends that agencies become rigid as a result of the chronological aging of the agency. With increased age, agencies lose general political support and become "captured" by the regulated interest. This paper examines the political support, interest relationships, and rigidity of eight regulatory agencies over the entire lifetime of the agency. Contrary to the theory's predictions, as agencies age they do not necessarily lose political support, they do not become more captured by the regulated industry, and they do not become more rigid. The findings suggest the reasons policy-makers normally accept for regulatory agency failure must be reevaluated.</description><subject>Administrative agencies</subject><subject>Administrative law</subject><subject>Age</subject><subject>Aviation regulation</subject><subject>Drug regulation</subject><subject>Economic regulation</subject><subject>Indexing in process</subject><subject>Industrial regulation</subject><subject>Management</subject><subject>Regulatory legislation</subject><subject>Regulatory reform</subject><subject>Regulatory theory</subject><issn>0043-4078</issn><issn>1065-9129</issn><issn>2325-8675</issn><issn>1938-274X</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1978</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>0R3</sourceid><sourceid>HYQOX</sourceid><sourceid>K30</sourceid><sourceid>~OC</sourceid><sourceid>~PQ</sourceid><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkV1LwzAUhoMoOKd_wKuCoFd1OTltkl6O4RcMBkOvS9qkJaNrZ9JezF9v5nYxFIZXBw7P-56Pl5BboI8AQkyA8jQDlglJESgFKs_IiCFLY8lFek5GlCYYJ1TIS3Ll_YpSipyzEUmXph4a1XduG0312rbW9071tmsj1epo4WrV2q-fhmqipa2ttv32mlxUqvHm5lDH5OP56X32Gs8XL2-z6TwukXEZJxWg0FCCBlFiZYQymUkhK7jOCjRMF2EJakomNYJEVqIuqrQqpTKgK0hwTB72vhvXfQ7G9_na-tI0jWpNN_hcgpThymxH3p8kOcUkDef_A2SIXEAA736Bq25w4Qs-D48GkckEd3ZsT5Wu896ZKt84u1ZumwPNd9Hkf6MJosle5FVtjmxPKQ7LrHyI6ngGQyryJBEYqG-iopgU</recordid><startdate>197803</startdate><enddate>197803</enddate><creator>Meier, Kenneth J.</creator><creator>Plumlee, John P.</creator><general>University of Utah</general><general>SAGE Publications</general><general>University of Utah Press, etc</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0R3</scope><scope>ABKTN</scope><scope>EOLOZ</scope><scope>FKUCP</scope><scope>HYQOX</scope><scope>IBDFT</scope><scope>K30</scope><scope>PAAUG</scope><scope>PAWHS</scope><scope>PAWZZ</scope><scope>PAXOH</scope><scope>PBHAV</scope><scope>PBQSW</scope><scope>PBYQZ</scope><scope>PCIWU</scope><scope>PCMID</scope><scope>PCZJX</scope><scope>PDGRG</scope><scope>PDWWI</scope><scope>PETMR</scope><scope>PFVGT</scope><scope>PGXDX</scope><scope>PIHIL</scope><scope>PISVA</scope><scope>PJCTQ</scope><scope>PJTMS</scope><scope>PLCHJ</scope><scope>PMHAD</scope><scope>PNQDJ</scope><scope>POUND</scope><scope>PPLAD</scope><scope>PQAPC</scope><scope>PQCAN</scope><scope>PQCMW</scope><scope>PQEME</scope><scope>PQHKH</scope><scope>PQMID</scope><scope>PQNCT</scope><scope>PQNET</scope><scope>PQSCT</scope><scope>PQSET</scope><scope>PSVJG</scope><scope>PVMQY</scope><scope>PZGFC</scope><scope>~OB</scope><scope>~OC</scope><scope>~OG</scope><scope>~PM</scope><scope>~PQ</scope><scope>7UB</scope></search><sort><creationdate>197803</creationdate><title>Regulatory Administration and Organizational Rigidity</title><author>Meier, Kenneth J. ; Plumlee, John P.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3268-4f137d1c1d17c3fe7ae9e519b6d9b3e2db3660ec28d31832c3dbf5fc8ae1df143</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1978</creationdate><topic>Administrative agencies</topic><topic>Administrative law</topic><topic>Age</topic><topic>Aviation regulation</topic><topic>Drug regulation</topic><topic>Economic regulation</topic><topic>Indexing in process</topic><topic>Industrial regulation</topic><topic>Management</topic><topic>Regulatory legislation</topic><topic>Regulatory reform</topic><topic>Regulatory theory</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Meier, Kenneth J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Plumlee, John P.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Periodicals Archive Online Collection 1.2</collection><collection>Periodicals Archive Online JSTOR Titles</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segment 01</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segment 04</collection><collection>ProQuest Historical Periodicals</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segment 27</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - West</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - International</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - MEA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Midwest</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Northeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Southeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - North Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Southeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - South Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - UK / I</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Canada</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - EMEALA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - North Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - South Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - International</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - International</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - West</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segments 1-50</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - APAC</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Midwest</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - MEA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Canada</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - UK / I</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - EMEALA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - APAC</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Canada</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - West</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - EMEALA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Northeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Midwest</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - North Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Northeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - South Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Southeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - UK / I</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - APAC</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - MEA</collection><collection>PAO Collection 1</collection><collection>Periodicals Archive Online Collection 1</collection><collection>PAO Collection 1 (purchase pre Feb/2008)</collection><collection>Periodicals Archive Online JISC Collection</collection><collection>Periodicals Archive Online Liberal Arts Collection 4</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><jtitle>The Western political quarterly</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Meier, Kenneth J.</au><au>Plumlee, John P.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Regulatory Administration and Organizational Rigidity</atitle><jtitle>The Western political quarterly</jtitle><date>1978-03</date><risdate>1978</risdate><volume>31</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>80</spage><epage>95</epage><pages>80-95</pages><issn>0043-4078</issn><issn>1065-9129</issn><eissn>2325-8675</eissn><eissn>1938-274X</eissn><abstract>Discussions of regulatory problems have been dominated by Bernstein's theory of regulatory agency decay which contends that agencies become rigid as a result of the chronological aging of the agency. With increased age, agencies lose general political support and become "captured" by the regulated interest. This paper examines the political support, interest relationships, and rigidity of eight regulatory agencies over the entire lifetime of the agency. Contrary to the theory's predictions, as agencies age they do not necessarily lose political support, they do not become more captured by the regulated industry, and they do not become more rigid. The findings suggest the reasons policy-makers normally accept for regulatory agency failure must be reevaluated.</abstract><cop>Thousand Oaks, CA</cop><pub>University of Utah</pub><doi>10.1177/106591297803100108</doi><tpages>16</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0043-4078 |
| ispartof | The Western political quarterly, 1978-03, Vol.31 (1), p.80-95 |
| issn | 0043-4078 1065-9129 2325-8675 1938-274X |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_818823294 |
| source | SAGE Complete A-Z List; Jstor Complete Legacy; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Alma/SFX Local Collection; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | Administrative agencies Administrative law Age Aviation regulation Drug regulation Economic regulation Indexing in process Industrial regulation Management Regulatory legislation Regulatory reform Regulatory theory |
| title | Regulatory Administration and Organizational Rigidity |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-15T23%3A19%3A41IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Regulatory%20Administration%20and%20Organizational%20Rigidity&rft.jtitle=The%20Western%20political%20quarterly&rft.au=Meier,%20Kenneth%20J.&rft.date=1978-03&rft.volume=31&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=80&rft.epage=95&rft.pages=80-95&rft.issn=0043-4078&rft.eissn=2325-8675&rft_id=info:doi/10.1177/106591297803100108&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E447308%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1291798438&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=447308&rft_sage_id=10.1177_106591297803100108&rfr_iscdi=true |