Moral Perception

: In this paper, I defend the view that we can have perceptual moral knowledge. First, I motivate the moral perception view by drawing on some examples involving perceptual knowledge of complex non‐moral properties. I argue that we have little reason to think that perception of moral properties coul...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	European journal of philosophy 2010-06, Vol.18 (2), p.159-175
1. Verfasser:	Cullison, Andrew
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Empiricism Knowledge Moral development Moral philosophy Morality Perceptions
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!