Knowing Your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars

When do civil wars last especially long? Commitment problems can stymie conflict resolution but they are not homogeneous across all civil wars. Indeed, combatants' perceptions of their adversaries significantly affect the severity of commitment problems. Intergroup interactions provide combatan...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of conflict resolution 2010-10, Vol.54 (5), p.745-770
1. Verfasser: Kirschner, Shanna A.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 770
container_issue 5
container_start_page 745
container_title The Journal of conflict resolution
container_volume 54
creator Kirschner, Shanna A.
description When do civil wars last especially long? Commitment problems can stymie conflict resolution but they are not homogeneous across all civil wars. Indeed, combatants' perceptions of their adversaries significantly affect the severity of commitment problems. Intergroup interactions provide combatants with one crucial type of information about their adversaries and about the risks associated with signing a peace settlement, shaping strategic decisions. The argument is tested against a new data set of all ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004. The results demonstrate that intergroup interactions prolong wars when they indicate that a peace deal will be especially fragile or that the costs of it breaking down will be especially high. This is true, regardless of the combatants' goals or their capabilities. In sum, information shapes perceptions and the severity of commitment problems, in turn affecting the duration of civil wars.
doi_str_mv 10.1177/0022002710372753
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_759520349</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>20773718</jstor_id><sage_id>10.1177_0022002710372753</sage_id><sourcerecordid>20773718</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c459t-df6abe085c866f1604a71736b7eab48bc754514cc8b541c6d77070b64873cd033</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqNkc1LxDAQxYMouK7evQgBD56qk6bJpN5kWT9Q0IMinkqaTaVLm2jSVfa_t6UiIgh7GGbg_d5jmCHkkMEpY4hnAGnaFzLgmKLgW2TChEgThVJuk8kgJ4O-S_ZiXAIMM0zI_Nb5z9q90he_CnTubLs-pzeu8qHVXe0d1W5BZ75t6661rqMPwZeNbSOtHZ3VH3VDn3WI-2Sn0k20B999Sp4u54-z6-Tu_upmdnGXmEzkXbKopC4tKGGUlBWTkGlkyGWJVpeZKg2KTLDMGFWKjBm5QASEUmYKuVkA51NyMua-Bf--srEr2joa2zTaWb-KBYpcpMCzfBOSsxyk2IyUTOAGpGIs51z25PEfctmf1_WnKVieqhSlEsOOMFIm-BiDrYq3ULc6rAsGxfDU4u9Te0syWqJ-tb9C_-ePRn4ZOx9-8lNA5MgU_wJuaKbp</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1928276859</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Knowing Your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars</title><source>Jstor Complete Legacy</source><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>SAGE Complete</source><creator>Kirschner, Shanna A.</creator><creatorcontrib>Kirschner, Shanna A.</creatorcontrib><description>When do civil wars last especially long? Commitment problems can stymie conflict resolution but they are not homogeneous across all civil wars. Indeed, combatants' perceptions of their adversaries significantly affect the severity of commitment problems. Intergroup interactions provide combatants with one crucial type of information about their adversaries and about the risks associated with signing a peace settlement, shaping strategic decisions. The argument is tested against a new data set of all ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004. The results demonstrate that intergroup interactions prolong wars when they indicate that a peace deal will be especially fragile or that the costs of it breaking down will be especially high. This is true, regardless of the combatants' goals or their capabilities. In sum, information shapes perceptions and the severity of commitment problems, in turn affecting the duration of civil wars.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-0027</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1552-8766</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1177/0022002710372753</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JCFRAL</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications</publisher><subject>Civil War ; Civil wars ; Cognition ; Commitment ; Conflict duration ; Conflict Resolution ; Datasets ; Decision making ; Economic discrimination ; Empirical tests ; Ethnic conflict ; Ethnicity ; Hostility ; Identifiability ; Inflation ; Information ; Information sources ; Interaction ; Interethnic conflict ; Intergroup relations ; Military research ; Peace ; Peace agreement ; Peacetime ; Perception ; Perceptions ; Risk ; Risk aversion ; Social information ; Standard deviation ; Violence ; War</subject><ispartof>The Journal of conflict resolution, 2010-10, Vol.54 (5), p.745-770</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2010 SAGE Publications</rights><rights>The Author(s) 2010</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c459t-df6abe085c866f1604a71736b7eab48bc754514cc8b541c6d77070b64873cd033</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c459t-df6abe085c866f1604a71736b7eab48bc754514cc8b541c6d77070b64873cd033</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20773718$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/20773718$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,21798,27901,27902,43597,43598,57992,58225</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Kirschner, Shanna A.</creatorcontrib><title>Knowing Your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars</title><title>The Journal of conflict resolution</title><description>When do civil wars last especially long? Commitment problems can stymie conflict resolution but they are not homogeneous across all civil wars. Indeed, combatants' perceptions of their adversaries significantly affect the severity of commitment problems. Intergroup interactions provide combatants with one crucial type of information about their adversaries and about the risks associated with signing a peace settlement, shaping strategic decisions. The argument is tested against a new data set of all ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004. The results demonstrate that intergroup interactions prolong wars when they indicate that a peace deal will be especially fragile or that the costs of it breaking down will be especially high. This is true, regardless of the combatants' goals or their capabilities. In sum, information shapes perceptions and the severity of commitment problems, in turn affecting the duration of civil wars.</description><subject>Civil War</subject><subject>Civil wars</subject><subject>Cognition</subject><subject>Commitment</subject><subject>Conflict duration</subject><subject>Conflict Resolution</subject><subject>Datasets</subject><subject>Decision making</subject><subject>Economic discrimination</subject><subject>Empirical tests</subject><subject>Ethnic conflict</subject><subject>Ethnicity</subject><subject>Hostility</subject><subject>Identifiability</subject><subject>Inflation</subject><subject>Information</subject><subject>Information sources</subject><subject>Interaction</subject><subject>Interethnic conflict</subject><subject>Intergroup relations</subject><subject>Military research</subject><subject>Peace</subject><subject>Peace agreement</subject><subject>Peacetime</subject><subject>Perception</subject><subject>Perceptions</subject><subject>Risk</subject><subject>Risk aversion</subject><subject>Social information</subject><subject>Standard deviation</subject><subject>Violence</subject><subject>War</subject><issn>0022-0027</issn><issn>1552-8766</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2010</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkc1LxDAQxYMouK7evQgBD56qk6bJpN5kWT9Q0IMinkqaTaVLm2jSVfa_t6UiIgh7GGbg_d5jmCHkkMEpY4hnAGnaFzLgmKLgW2TChEgThVJuk8kgJ4O-S_ZiXAIMM0zI_Nb5z9q90he_CnTubLs-pzeu8qHVXe0d1W5BZ75t6661rqMPwZeNbSOtHZ3VH3VDn3WI-2Sn0k20B999Sp4u54-z6-Tu_upmdnGXmEzkXbKopC4tKGGUlBWTkGlkyGWJVpeZKg2KTLDMGFWKjBm5QASEUmYKuVkA51NyMua-Bf--srEr2joa2zTaWb-KBYpcpMCzfBOSsxyk2IyUTOAGpGIs51z25PEfctmf1_WnKVieqhSlEsOOMFIm-BiDrYq3ULc6rAsGxfDU4u9Te0syWqJ-tb9C_-ePRn4ZOx9-8lNA5MgU_wJuaKbp</recordid><startdate>20101001</startdate><enddate>20101001</enddate><creator>Kirschner, Shanna A.</creator><general>Sage Publications</general><general>SAGE Publications</general><general>SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>7U1</scope><scope>7U2</scope><scope>C1K</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20101001</creationdate><title>Knowing Your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars</title><author>Kirschner, Shanna A.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c459t-df6abe085c866f1604a71736b7eab48bc754514cc8b541c6d77070b64873cd033</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2010</creationdate><topic>Civil War</topic><topic>Civil wars</topic><topic>Cognition</topic><topic>Commitment</topic><topic>Conflict duration</topic><topic>Conflict Resolution</topic><topic>Datasets</topic><topic>Decision making</topic><topic>Economic discrimination</topic><topic>Empirical tests</topic><topic>Ethnic conflict</topic><topic>Ethnicity</topic><topic>Hostility</topic><topic>Identifiability</topic><topic>Inflation</topic><topic>Information</topic><topic>Information sources</topic><topic>Interaction</topic><topic>Interethnic conflict</topic><topic>Intergroup relations</topic><topic>Military research</topic><topic>Peace</topic><topic>Peace agreement</topic><topic>Peacetime</topic><topic>Perception</topic><topic>Perceptions</topic><topic>Risk</topic><topic>Risk aversion</topic><topic>Social information</topic><topic>Standard deviation</topic><topic>Violence</topic><topic>War</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Kirschner, Shanna A.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Risk Abstracts</collection><collection>Safety Science and Risk</collection><collection>Environmental Sciences and Pollution Management</collection><jtitle>The Journal of conflict resolution</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Kirschner, Shanna A.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Knowing Your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars</atitle><jtitle>The Journal of conflict resolution</jtitle><date>2010-10-01</date><risdate>2010</risdate><volume>54</volume><issue>5</issue><spage>745</spage><epage>770</epage><pages>745-770</pages><issn>0022-0027</issn><eissn>1552-8766</eissn><coden>JCFRAL</coden><abstract>When do civil wars last especially long? Commitment problems can stymie conflict resolution but they are not homogeneous across all civil wars. Indeed, combatants' perceptions of their adversaries significantly affect the severity of commitment problems. Intergroup interactions provide combatants with one crucial type of information about their adversaries and about the risks associated with signing a peace settlement, shaping strategic decisions. The argument is tested against a new data set of all ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004. The results demonstrate that intergroup interactions prolong wars when they indicate that a peace deal will be especially fragile or that the costs of it breaking down will be especially high. This is true, regardless of the combatants' goals or their capabilities. In sum, information shapes perceptions and the severity of commitment problems, in turn affecting the duration of civil wars.</abstract><cop>Los Angeles, CA</cop><pub>Sage Publications</pub><doi>10.1177/0022002710372753</doi><tpages>26</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0022-0027
ispartof The Journal of conflict resolution, 2010-10, Vol.54 (5), p.745-770
issn 0022-0027
1552-8766
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_759520349
source Jstor Complete Legacy; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SAGE Complete
subjects Civil War
Civil wars
Cognition
Commitment
Conflict duration
Conflict Resolution
Datasets
Decision making
Economic discrimination
Empirical tests
Ethnic conflict
Ethnicity
Hostility
Identifiability
Inflation
Information
Information sources
Interaction
Interethnic conflict
Intergroup relations
Military research
Peace
Peace agreement
Peacetime
Perception
Perceptions
Risk
Risk aversion
Social information
Standard deviation
Violence
War
title Knowing Your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-07T22%3A43%3A12IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Knowing%20Your%20Enemy:%20Information%20and%20Commitment%20Problems%20in%20Civil%20Wars&rft.jtitle=The%20Journal%20of%20conflict%20resolution&rft.au=Kirschner,%20Shanna%20A.&rft.date=2010-10-01&rft.volume=54&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=745&rft.epage=770&rft.pages=745-770&rft.issn=0022-0027&rft.eissn=1552-8766&rft.coden=JCFRAL&rft_id=info:doi/10.1177/0022002710372753&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E20773718%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1928276859&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=20773718&rft_sage_id=10.1177_0022002710372753&rfr_iscdi=true