Adverse selection, endogenous borrowing constraints and firm growth

If banks face asymmetric information about loan quality, endogenous borrowing constraints which restrict the size of new firms may emerge in equilibrium. High quality firms reduce financing costs by starting off small and increasing their size over time.

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Economics letters 2010-08, Vol.108 (2), p.219-221
Hauptverfasser:	Fishman, Arthur, Krausz, Miriam
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Access to capital Asymmetric information Bank loans Corporate finance Endogenous borrowing constraints Endogenous borrowing constraints Firm growth Asymmetric information Firm growth
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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