In search of experimental support for an asymmetric equilibria solution in symmetric investment games
In one of their experimental studies, Rapoport and Amaldoss [Rapoport, A., Amaldoss, W., 2000. Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42, 483–521] evaluate the be...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic behavior & organization 2008-07, Vol.67 (1), p.200-203 |
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| creator | Rapoport, Amnon Amaldoss, Wilfred |
| description | In one of their experimental studies, Rapoport and Amaldoss [Rapoport, A., Amaldoss, W., 2000. Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42, 483–521] evaluate the behavior of subjects in a two-person investment game with symmetric players using the symmetric (completely) mixed-strategy equilibrium solution as the normative benchmark. Dechenaux et al. [Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., Lugovskyy, V., 2006. Caps on bidding in all-pay auctions: comments on the experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61, 276–283] claim additional support for an alternating (asymmetric) equilibria solution. However, both aggregate and individual level analyses of our data soundly reject the asymmetric alternating equilibria solution. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.07.001 |
| format | Article |
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| source | Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA); RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Alternating (asymmetric) mixed-strategy equilibria Asymmetry Auctions Economic behaviour Elimination Equilibrium Equilibrium models Experimental economics Experimental test Game theory Games Investment Periodicals Studies Symmetric (completely) mixed-strategy equilibrium |
| title | In search of experimental support for an asymmetric equilibria solution in symmetric investment games |
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