The role of private benefits in information acquisition
In many cases, the cost of hiring an agent to acquire information is lower than the cost for the principal to perform that task. However, because of a difference in preferences between the principal and the agent, the principal often cannot fully utilize the agent’s expertise. This paper considers t...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic behavior & organization 2008-12, Vol.68 (3), p.626-631 |
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| container_title | Journal of economic behavior & organization |
| container_volume | 68 |
| creator | Hori, Kazumi |
| description | In many cases, the cost of hiring an agent to acquire information is lower than the cost for the principal to perform that task. However, because of a difference in preferences between the principal and the agent, the principal often cannot fully utilize the agent’s expertise. This paper considers the cost of motivating the agent to acquire information and inducing him to report truthfully. The larger the private benefit, the greater is the cost of eliciting true information. At the same time, a private benefit may reduce the cost of motivating information acquisition. Thus, there are cases in which an agent with a different preference is desirable. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.07.003 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of economic behavior & organization, 2008-12, Vol.68 (3), p.626-631 |
| issn | 0167-2681 1879-1751 |
| language | eng |
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| source | RePEc; Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA); Access via ScienceDirect (Elsevier) |
| subjects | Agency cost Agency theory Asymmetric information Cost-benefit analysis Expertise Hiring Information acquisition Motivation Preferences Principal-agent theory Private benefits Private benefits Information acquisition Agency cost Asymmetric information Studies |
| title | The role of private benefits in information acquisition |
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