Locational market power in network constrained markets
This paper studies the issue of locational market power of suppliers in a market that is situated on a network. Locational market power arises when locational advantage allows suppliers to act non-competitively and raise prices above competitive levels. We propose a quantifiable definition of locati...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic behavior & organization 2009-05, Vol.70 (1), p.416-430 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , , , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 430 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 416 |
| container_title | Journal of economic behavior & organization |
| container_volume | 70 |
| creator | Atkins, Karla Chen, Jiangzhuo Anil Kumar, V.S. Macauley, Matthew Marathe, Achla |
| description | This paper studies the issue of locational market power of suppliers in a market that is situated on a network. Locational market power arises when locational advantage allows suppliers to act non-competitively and raise prices above competitive levels. We propose a quantifiable definition of locational market power and analyze its properties over a general network. We also conduct a detailed analysis of the topological cause of the market power for a real electrical network using network analysis tools. We show that strategic alliances among small generators with geographical advantage can lead to significant amounts of market power. In the case of inelastic demand, the collusive behavior among suppliers leads to higher incidence of locational market power. This power is curtailed as demand becomes more responsive to price, supporting the view that efficient markets require active participation from the consumers. We also observe that if the supply is more elastic than demand, then supply can override some of the positive effects of elastic demand. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.001 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_754134988</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S0167268108002199</els_id><sourcerecordid>1683521881</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c521t-def6dea0add09165e681effa507665b757f8b39de1c15f48c2c1fc16493c261c3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kE1r3DAQhkVpINukfyAn00N7sqPRpw25lNB8wEIv7Vlo5XErZ9dyJG9C_n1n2ZBDDxmYmcvzvsy8jF0Ab4CDuRybETepEZy3DUDDOXxgK2htV4PV8JGtCLK1MC2csk-ljJzKim7FzDoFv8Q0-W218_kBl2pOz5irOFUTLs8pP1QhTWXJPk7YvzLlnJ0Mflvw8-s-Y79vfvy6vqvXP2_vr7-v66AFLHWPg-nRc9_3vAOjkQ7AYfCaW2P0xmo7tBvZ9QgB9KDaIAIMAYzqZBAGgjxj346-c06PeyyL28UScLv1E6Z9cVYrkKprWyK_vktKC1pqrQn88h84pn2m_4sTkrdKKQCCxBEKOZWScXBzjvT7iwPuDom70R0Sd4fEHYCjxEm0PooyzhjeFIh4QPMf9-Skt5zGCzUpO1qRGpygOVMrclaSu7_LjuyujnZIAT9FzK6EiFPAPmYMi-tTfO-af7f1opM</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>230844411</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Locational market power in network constrained markets</title><source>RePEc</source><source>Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA)</source><source>ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present)</source><creator>Atkins, Karla ; Chen, Jiangzhuo ; Anil Kumar, V.S. ; Macauley, Matthew ; Marathe, Achla</creator><creatorcontrib>Atkins, Karla ; Chen, Jiangzhuo ; Anil Kumar, V.S. ; Macauley, Matthew ; Marathe, Achla</creatorcontrib><description>This paper studies the issue of locational market power of suppliers in a market that is situated on a network. Locational market power arises when locational advantage allows suppliers to act non-competitively and raise prices above competitive levels. We propose a quantifiable definition of locational market power and analyze its properties over a general network. We also conduct a detailed analysis of the topological cause of the market power for a real electrical network using network analysis tools. We show that strategic alliances among small generators with geographical advantage can lead to significant amounts of market power. In the case of inelastic demand, the collusive behavior among suppliers leads to higher incidence of locational market power. This power is curtailed as demand becomes more responsive to price, supporting the view that efficient markets require active participation from the consumers. We also observe that if the supply is more elastic than demand, then supply can override some of the positive effects of elastic demand.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0167-2681</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1879-1751</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.001</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JEBOD9</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Alliances ; Attitudes ; Coalitions ; Competition ; Consumer participation ; Efficient markets ; Elasticity of demand ; Electrical grid ; Geographic location ; Market power ; Market power Network topology Coalitions Electrical grid ; Network analysis ; Network topology ; Networks ; Power ; Prices ; Pricing ; Strategic planning ; Studies ; Suppliers ; Supply & demand ; Supply and demand</subject><ispartof>Journal of economic behavior & organization, 2009-05, Vol.70 (1), p.416-430</ispartof><rights>2008</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. May 2009</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c521t-def6dea0add09165e681effa507665b757f8b39de1c15f48c2c1fc16493c261c3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c521t-def6dea0add09165e681effa507665b757f8b39de1c15f48c2c1fc16493c261c3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.001$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,3548,4006,27922,27923,30997,30998,45993</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejeborg/v_3a70_3ay_3a2009_3ai_3a1-2_3ap_3a416-430.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Atkins, Karla</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Jiangzhuo</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Anil Kumar, V.S.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Macauley, Matthew</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Marathe, Achla</creatorcontrib><title>Locational market power in network constrained markets</title><title>Journal of economic behavior & organization</title><description>This paper studies the issue of locational market power of suppliers in a market that is situated on a network. Locational market power arises when locational advantage allows suppliers to act non-competitively and raise prices above competitive levels. We propose a quantifiable definition of locational market power and analyze its properties over a general network. We also conduct a detailed analysis of the topological cause of the market power for a real electrical network using network analysis tools. We show that strategic alliances among small generators with geographical advantage can lead to significant amounts of market power. In the case of inelastic demand, the collusive behavior among suppliers leads to higher incidence of locational market power. This power is curtailed as demand becomes more responsive to price, supporting the view that efficient markets require active participation from the consumers. We also observe that if the supply is more elastic than demand, then supply can override some of the positive effects of elastic demand.</description><subject>Alliances</subject><subject>Attitudes</subject><subject>Coalitions</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Consumer participation</subject><subject>Efficient markets</subject><subject>Elasticity of demand</subject><subject>Electrical grid</subject><subject>Geographic location</subject><subject>Market power</subject><subject>Market power Network topology Coalitions Electrical grid</subject><subject>Network analysis</subject><subject>Network topology</subject><subject>Networks</subject><subject>Power</subject><subject>Prices</subject><subject>Pricing</subject><subject>Strategic planning</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Suppliers</subject><subject>Supply & demand</subject><subject>Supply and demand</subject><issn>0167-2681</issn><issn>1879-1751</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2009</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>X2L</sourceid><sourceid>7QJ</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kE1r3DAQhkVpINukfyAn00N7sqPRpw25lNB8wEIv7Vlo5XErZ9dyJG9C_n1n2ZBDDxmYmcvzvsy8jF0Ab4CDuRybETepEZy3DUDDOXxgK2htV4PV8JGtCLK1MC2csk-ljJzKim7FzDoFv8Q0-W218_kBl2pOz5irOFUTLs8pP1QhTWXJPk7YvzLlnJ0Mflvw8-s-Y79vfvy6vqvXP2_vr7-v66AFLHWPg-nRc9_3vAOjkQ7AYfCaW2P0xmo7tBvZ9QgB9KDaIAIMAYzqZBAGgjxj346-c06PeyyL28UScLv1E6Z9cVYrkKprWyK_vktKC1pqrQn88h84pn2m_4sTkrdKKQCCxBEKOZWScXBzjvT7iwPuDom70R0Sd4fEHYCjxEm0PooyzhjeFIh4QPMf9-Skt5zGCzUpO1qRGpygOVMrclaSu7_LjuyujnZIAT9FzK6EiFPAPmYMi-tTfO-af7f1opM</recordid><startdate>20090501</startdate><enddate>20090501</enddate><creator>Atkins, Karla</creator><creator>Chen, Jiangzhuo</creator><creator>Anil Kumar, V.S.</creator><creator>Macauley, Matthew</creator><creator>Marathe, Achla</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier</general><general>Elsevier Sequoia S.A</general><scope>DKI</scope><scope>X2L</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7QJ</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20090501</creationdate><title>Locational market power in network constrained markets</title><author>Atkins, Karla ; Chen, Jiangzhuo ; Anil Kumar, V.S. ; Macauley, Matthew ; Marathe, Achla</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c521t-def6dea0add09165e681effa507665b757f8b39de1c15f48c2c1fc16493c261c3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2009</creationdate><topic>Alliances</topic><topic>Attitudes</topic><topic>Coalitions</topic><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Consumer participation</topic><topic>Efficient markets</topic><topic>Elasticity of demand</topic><topic>Electrical grid</topic><topic>Geographic location</topic><topic>Market power</topic><topic>Market power Network topology Coalitions Electrical grid</topic><topic>Network analysis</topic><topic>Network topology</topic><topic>Networks</topic><topic>Power</topic><topic>Prices</topic><topic>Pricing</topic><topic>Strategic planning</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Suppliers</topic><topic>Supply & demand</topic><topic>Supply and demand</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Atkins, Karla</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Jiangzhuo</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Anil Kumar, V.S.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Macauley, Matthew</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Marathe, Achla</creatorcontrib><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of economic behavior & organization</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Atkins, Karla</au><au>Chen, Jiangzhuo</au><au>Anil Kumar, V.S.</au><au>Macauley, Matthew</au><au>Marathe, Achla</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Locational market power in network constrained markets</atitle><jtitle>Journal of economic behavior & organization</jtitle><date>2009-05-01</date><risdate>2009</risdate><volume>70</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>416</spage><epage>430</epage><pages>416-430</pages><issn>0167-2681</issn><eissn>1879-1751</eissn><coden>JEBOD9</coden><abstract>This paper studies the issue of locational market power of suppliers in a market that is situated on a network. Locational market power arises when locational advantage allows suppliers to act non-competitively and raise prices above competitive levels. We propose a quantifiable definition of locational market power and analyze its properties over a general network. We also conduct a detailed analysis of the topological cause of the market power for a real electrical network using network analysis tools. We show that strategic alliances among small generators with geographical advantage can lead to significant amounts of market power. In the case of inelastic demand, the collusive behavior among suppliers leads to higher incidence of locational market power. This power is curtailed as demand becomes more responsive to price, supporting the view that efficient markets require active participation from the consumers. We also observe that if the supply is more elastic than demand, then supply can override some of the positive effects of elastic demand.</abstract><cop>Amsterdam</cop><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><doi>10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.001</doi><tpages>15</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0167-2681 |
| ispartof | Journal of economic behavior & organization, 2009-05, Vol.70 (1), p.416-430 |
| issn | 0167-2681 1879-1751 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_754134988 |
| source | RePEc; Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA); ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Alliances Attitudes Coalitions Competition Consumer participation Efficient markets Elasticity of demand Electrical grid Geographic location Market power Market power Network topology Coalitions Electrical grid Network analysis Network topology Networks Power Prices Pricing Strategic planning Studies Suppliers Supply & demand Supply and demand |
| title | Locational market power in network constrained markets |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-09T19%3A00%3A41IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Locational%20market%20power%20in%20network%20constrained%20markets&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20economic%20behavior%20&%20organization&rft.au=Atkins,%20Karla&rft.date=2009-05-01&rft.volume=70&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=416&rft.epage=430&rft.pages=416-430&rft.issn=0167-2681&rft.eissn=1879-1751&rft.coden=JEBOD9&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.001&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E1683521881%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=230844411&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_els_id=S0167268108002199&rfr_iscdi=true |