Putting Foxes in Charge of the Hen-House: The Political Economy of Harvest Quota Regulations

This paper considers a dynamic common agency model of natural resource harvest quota regulation in which both conservationists and harvesters vie to influence the regulator's quota allocations as well as the choice of regulator. Conservationists tend to benefit from the adoption of regulation s...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Environmental & resource economics 2010-08, Vol.46 (4), p.475-493
1. Verfasser:	Boyce, John R
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Aggregates Allocations C73 Campaign contributions Common agency Conservation Control Councils D72 Economic Policy Economics Economics and Finance Endangered & extinct species Environmental Economics Environmental Law/Policy/Ecojustice Environmental Management Environmental regulations Equilibrium Fisheries management Harvesters Harvesting Marine conservation Markovian processes Natural resources Nature conservation Political economy Politics Q28 Q38 Quota systems Quotas Regulation Regulators Regulatory agencies Studies Truthful Markov perfect equilibrium Welfare Wildlife conservation
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