Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending

"Strong" political parties within legislatures are one possible solution to the problem of inefficient universalism, a norm under which all legislators seek large projects for their districts that are paid for out of a common pool. We demonstrate that even if parties have no role in the le...

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Veröffentlicht in:	American journal of political science 2010-04, Vol.54 (2), p.354-370
Hauptverfasser:	Primo, David M., Snyder, Jr, James M.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Constituencies Cost allocation Electoral volatility Expenditures Federal aid Government bureaucracy Government spending Legislative behaviour Legislative Bodies Legislators Legislatures Norms Organizational Structure Parliamentary groups Party organization Political elections Political parties Political science Public expenditure Public goods Resource allocation U.S.A Universalism Voting
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