Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agentproposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms—individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity—are essenti...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Econometrica 2010-03, Vol.78 (2), p.633-653 |
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| container_title | Econometrica |
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| creator | Kojima, Fuhito Manea, Mihai |
| description | The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agentproposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms—individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity—are essential to our analysis. An allocation rule is the agent-proposing deferred acceptance rule for some acceptant substitutable priority if and only if it satisfies non-wastefulness and individually rational monotonicity. An alternative characterization is in terms of non-wastefulness, population monotonicity, and weak Maskin monotonicity. We also offer an axiomatization of the deferred acceptance rule generated by an exogenously specified priority structure. We apply our results to characterize efficient deferred acceptance rules. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.3982/ECTA7443 |
| format | Article |
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We provide two characterizations of agentproposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms—individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity—are essential to our analysis. An allocation rule is the agent-proposing deferred acceptance rule for some acceptant substitutable priority if and only if it satisfies non-wastefulness and individually rational monotonicity. An alternative characterization is in terms of non-wastefulness, population monotonicity, and weak Maskin monotonicity. We also offer an axiomatization of the deferred acceptance rule generated by an exogenously specified priority structure. 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We provide two characterizations of agentproposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms—individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity—are essential to our analysis. An allocation rule is the agent-proposing deferred acceptance rule for some acceptant substitutable priority if and only if it satisfies non-wastefulness and individually rational monotonicity. An alternative characterization is in terms of non-wastefulness, population monotonicity, and weak Maskin monotonicity. We also offer an axiomatization of the deferred acceptance rule generated by an exogenously specified priority structure. We apply our results to characterize efficient deferred acceptance rules.</abstract><cop>Oxford, UK</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</pub><doi>10.3982/ECTA7443</doi><tpages>21</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | Econometrica, 2010-03, Vol.78 (2), p.633-653 |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; JSTOR Mathematics & Statistics |
| subjects | Algorithms Allocations Allocative efficiency Applications Axiomatization Axioms Deferred acceptance algorithm Dictatorship Econometrics Economic theory Efficient strategies Exact sciences and technology Game theory individually rational monotonicity Insurance, economics, finance Mathematical monotonicity Mathematical sets Mathematics Microeconomics non-wastefulness Pareto efficiency population monotonicity Probability and statistics Probability theory and stochastic processes Resource allocation Sciences and techniques of general use Special processes (renewal theory, markov renewal processes, semi-markov processes, statistical mechanics type models, applications) stable allocations Statistics Studies Utility theory weak Maskin monotonicity |
| title | Axioms for Deferred Acceptance |
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