Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt

Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk-taking, while large vegas encourage risk-taking. Theory suggests that short-ma...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Journal of finance (New York) 2010-06, Vol.65 (3), p.1123-1161
Hauptverfasser:	BROCKMAN, PAUL, MARTIN, XIUMIN, UNLU, EMRE
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Business management Chief executive officers Corporate debt Corporate finance Debt Executive compensation Financial instruments Financial leverage Financial management Options on stocks Preferences Rates of return Risk assessment Risk management Senior management Short term debt Stock options Stock prices Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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