Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy

Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy

This article summarizes a small part of the literature on laboratory experiments in political economy. The experiments discussed are primarily aimed at testing predictions of equilibrium models of voting in committees and elections. The specific topics discussed are voter turnout, the Condorcet jury...

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Veröffentlicht in:Annual review of political science 2009-06, Vol.12 (1), p.379-388
1. Verfasser: Palfrey, Thomas R.
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Sprache:eng
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Equilibrium models
Experiments
Forecasts
Political economy
Political science research
Voting behaviour
Voting turnout
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description This article summarizes a small part of the literature on laboratory experiments in political economy. The experiments discussed are primarily aimed at testing predictions of equilibrium models of voting in committees and elections. The specific topics discussed are voter turnout, the Condorcet jury theorem, and the swing voter's curse. The latter two topics address questions of information aggregation by voting rules. All the experiments find significant evidence of strategic voting and, with a few exceptions, find support for the equilibrium predictions of the theories.
doi_str_mv 10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.091007.122139
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subjects Equilibrium models
Experiments
Forecasts
Political economy
Political science research
Voting behaviour
Voting turnout
title Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy
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