Flexibility mechanisms and credit discounting

We consider the international treaties on climate change as self-enforcing agreements. Applying non-cooperative game theory, we interpret the UN framework Convention on Climate Change as a Nash equilibrium outcome of an international abatement game where only domestic abatement is allowed. The Kyoto...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Environment and development economics 2003-05, Vol.8 (2), p.247-260
Hauptverfasser:	Shin, Sungwhee, Suh, Sang-Chul
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Air pollution Clean Development Mechanism Climate change Costs Credit Developed countries Developing countries Development economics Discounting Emissions reduction Emissions trading Equilibrium Game theory Greenhouse effect Greenhouse gases Industrialized nations Kyoto Protocol LDCs Marginal costs Nash equilibrium Theory and Applications Treaties
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