Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists

How should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity—one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly.

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Economics letters 2010-04, Vol.107 (1), p.52-54
Hauptverfasser:	Bernhardt, Dan, Polborn, Mattias K.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Economic models Hidden defenses Hidden defenses Resource allocation Security Randomization Terrorism Randomization Resource allocation Security Terrorism
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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