Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists
How should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity—one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly.
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Economics letters 2010-04, Vol.107 (1), p.52-54 |
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| container_end_page | 54 |
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| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 52 |
| container_title | Economics letters |
| container_volume | 107 |
| creator | Bernhardt, Dan Polborn, Mattias K. |
| description | How should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity—one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.024 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0165-1765 |
| ispartof | Economics letters, 2010-04, Vol.107 (1), p.52-54 |
| issn | 0165-1765 1873-7374 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_743810938 |
| source | RePEc; Access via ScienceDirect (Elsevier) |
| subjects | Economic models Hidden defenses Hidden defenses Resource allocation Security Randomization Terrorism Randomization Resource allocation Security Terrorism |
| title | Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists |
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