Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists

Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists

How should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity—one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly.

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2010-04, Vol.107 (1), p.52-54
Hauptverfasser: Bernhardt, Dan, Polborn, Mattias K.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Economic models
Hidden defenses
Hidden defenses Resource allocation Security Randomization Terrorism
Randomization
Resource allocation
Security
Terrorism
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Zusammenfassung:How should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity—one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.024