The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default
This paper surveys the recent literature on sovereign debt and relates it to the evolution of the legal principles underlying the sovereign debt market and the experience of the most recent debt crises and defaults. It finds limited support for theories that explain the feasibility of sovereign debt...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic literature 2009-09, Vol.47 (3), p.651-698 |
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| container_end_page | 698 |
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| container_issue | 3 |
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| container_title | Journal of economic literature |
| container_volume | 47 |
| creator | Panizza, Ugo Sturzenegger, Federico Zettelmeyer, Jeromin |
| description | This paper surveys the recent literature on sovereign debt and relates it to the evolution of the legal principles underlying the sovereign debt market and the experience of the most recent debt crises and defaults. It finds limited support for theories that explain the feasibility of sovereign debt based on either external sanctions or exclusion from the international capital market and more support for explanations that emphasize domestic costs of default. The paper concludes that there remains a case for establishing institutions that reduce the cost of default but the design of such institutions is not a trivial task. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1257/jel.47.3.651 |
| format | Article |
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It finds limited support for theories that explain the feasibility of sovereign debt based on either external sanctions or exclusion from the international capital market and more support for explanations that emphasize domestic costs of default. 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It finds limited support for theories that explain the feasibility of sovereign debt based on either external sanctions or exclusion from the international capital market and more support for explanations that emphasize domestic costs of default. The paper concludes that there remains a case for establishing institutions that reduce the cost of default but the design of such institutions is not a trivial task.</abstract><cop>Nashville</cop><pub>American Economic Association</pub><doi>10.1257/jel.47.3.651</doi><tpages>48</tpages></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | Journal of economic literature, 2009-09, Vol.47 (3), p.651-698 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Business Source Complete; Jstor Complete Legacy; American Economic Association Web |
| subjects | Capital markets Collective action Corporate debt Cost reduction Costs Countries Creditors Debt Debt contracts Debt policy Debt repayment Debt restructuring Debtors Default Developing countries Development economics Economic theory Enforcement International banking International capital market International finance International financial institutions Law enforcement LDCs Loan defaults Macroeconomics Principles Privileges & immunities Public debt Sovereign debt State laws Studies |
| title | The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default |
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