Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

Consider an election in which each of the n voters casts a vote consisting of a strict preference ranking of the three candidates A, B, and C. In the limit as n [arrow right] infinity, which scoring rule maximizes, under the assumption of Impartial Anonymous Culture (uniform probability distribution...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Theory and decision 2005-03, Vol.58 (2), p.145-185
Hauptverfasser:	CERVONE, Davide P, GEHRLEIN, William V, ZWICKER, William S
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Applied sciences Borda count Candidates Decision making Decision theory Decision theory. Utility theory Economic analysis Efficiency Elections Exact sciences and technology Mathematical methods Numerical analysis Operational research and scientific management Operational research. Management science Preferences Probability Probability distribution Statistical models Studies Voter behavior Voters Voting behaviour
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