Agency Responsiveness to the Legislative Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: A Case Study of Rules Review in the Illinois General Assembly
Students of public administration have long maintained that for bureaucratic power to be in balance with constitutional democracy, it must be exercised by a responsible bureaucracy. Legislative oversight is one means by which to secure the responsible exercise of this power. However, little is known...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | American review of public administration 1989-09, Vol.19 (3), p.217-231 |
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| container_title | American review of public administration |
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| creator | Bowers, James R. |
| description | Students of public administration have long maintained that for bureaucratic power to be in balance with constitutional democracy, it must be exercised by a responsible bureaucracy. Legislative oversight is one means by which to secure the responsible exercise of this power. However, little is known regarding why agencies are responsive to oversight. In this article this question is explored by presenting a case study of bureaucratic responsiveness to a highly specialized and routine approach to oversight found in state legislatures—the legislative review of administrative rule-making or "rules review." Five factors that appear to explain agency responsiveness are presented as analytical generalizations that may find application elsewhere; these include the lack of relevance that oversight may have for many legislators, the availability of sanctions that can be applied against nonresponsive agencies, the working relationship between an oversight committee and the agencies, agency costs associated with responsiveness, and the oversight committee's faithfulness to the legislature's original intent. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1177/027507408901900303 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0275-0740 |
| ispartof | American review of public administration, 1989-09, Vol.19 (3), p.217-231 |
| issn | 0275-0740 1552-3357 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_743217780 |
| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SAGE Complete; Alma/SFX Local Collection; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | BUREAUCRACY Case studies Case Study ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE BODIES Legislative oversight Legislature OVER/SIGHT Oversight Political aspects Public Administration RELATIONS BETWEEN OR AMONG BRANCHES OR DEPARTMENTS OF THE SAME GOVERNMENT State Government (Illinois) |
| title | Agency Responsiveness to the Legislative Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: A Case Study of Rules Review in the Illinois General Assembly |
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