Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games

Evolutionary game dynamics of two-player asymmetric games in finite populations is studied. We consider two roles in the game, roles α and β . α -players and β -players interact and gain payoffs. The game is described by a pair of matrices, which is called bimatrix. One's payoff in the game is...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of theoretical biology 2010-05, Vol.264 (1), p.136-142
1. Verfasser: Ohtsuki, Hisashi
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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