Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games
Evolutionary game dynamics of two-player asymmetric games in finite populations is studied. We consider two roles in the game, roles α and β . α -players and β -players interact and gain payoffs. The game is described by a pair of matrices, which is called bimatrix. One's payoff in the game is...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of theoretical biology 2010-05, Vol.264 (1), p.136-142 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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