Social norms and illicit behavior: an evolutionary model of compliance

Economists have viewed the presence of externalities and other market failures as leading to a private equilibrium that would not be Pareto optimal. In the exploitation of common-pool resources, especially biological resources, this would lead to the much-discussed ‘tragedy of the commons’. A challe...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Journal of environmental management 2002-09, Vol.66 (1), p.67-76
Hauptverfasser: Haab, Timothy C., McConnell, Kenneth E.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!