Optimal health insurance: the case of observable, severe illness

We explore optimal cost-sharing provisions for insurance contracts when individuals have observable, severe diseases with a discrete number of medically appropriate treatment options. Variation in preferences for alternative treatments is unobserved by the insurer and non-contractible. Interest in s...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of health economics 2000-09, Vol.19 (5), p.585-609
Hauptverfasser:	Chernew, Michael E., Encinosa, William E., Hirth, Richard A.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Chronic sickness Cost Sharing Decision Making Deductibles and Coinsurance - economics Disease Management Fees and Charges Group decision making Health administration Health economics Health expenditure Health insurance Humans Illness Insurance, Health - economics Insurance, Health - standards Male Mathematical models Models, Econometric Moral dilemmas Moral hazard Morals Optimization Patient Satisfaction - economics Payments Preferences Prostatic cancer Prostatic Neoplasms - economics Prostatic Neoplasms - therapy Statistical analysis Studies Treatment-specific copayments
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