Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will

The experience of willing an act arises from interpreting one's thought as the cause of the act. Conscious will is thus experienced as a function of the priority, consistency, and exclusivity of the thought about the action. The thought must occur before the action, be consistent with the actio...

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Veröffentlicht in:The American psychologist 1999-07, Vol.54 (7), p.480-492
Hauptverfasser: Wegner, Daniel M, Wheatley, Thalia
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:The experience of willing an act arises from interpreting one's thought as the cause of the act. Conscious will is thus experienced as a function of the priority, consistency, and exclusivity of the thought about the action. The thought must occur before the action, be consistent with the action, and not be accompanied by other causes. An experiment illustrating the role of priority found that people can arrive at the mistaken belief that they have intentionally caused an action that in fact they were forced to perform when they are simply led to think about the action just before its occurrence.
ISSN:0003-066X
1935-990X
DOI:10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.480