Functional Impulsivity and Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory

ABSTRACT In this article, we attempt to integrate Dickman's (1990) descriptive concept of Functional Impulsivity (FI) with Gray's (1970, 1991) Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST). Specifically, we consider that FI bears great conceptual similarity to Gray's concept of reward‐reacti...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of personality 2006-02, Vol.74 (1), p.47-84
Hauptverfasser: Smillie, Luke D., Jackson, Chris J.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:ABSTRACT In this article, we attempt to integrate Dickman's (1990) descriptive concept of Functional Impulsivity (FI) with Gray's (1970, 1991) Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST). Specifically, we consider that FI bears great conceptual similarity to Gray's concept of reward‐reactivity, which is thought to be caused by the combined effects of a Behavioral Activation System (BAS) and Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS). In our first study, we examine the construct validity and structural correlates of FI. Results indicate that FI is related positively to measures of BAS and Extraversion, negatively to measures of BIS and Neuroticism, and is separate from Psychoticism and typical trait Impulsivity, which Dickman calls Dysfunctional Impulsivity (DI). In our second study, we use a go/no‐go discrimination task to examine the relationship between FI and response bias under conditions of rewarding and punishing feedback. Results indicate that FI, along with two measures of BAS, predicted the development of a response bias for the rewarded alternative. In comparison, high DI appeared to reflect indifference toward either reward or punishment. We consider how these findings might reconcile the perspectives of Gray and Dickman and help clarify the broader understanding of Impulsivity.
ISSN:0022-3506
1467-6494
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2005.00369.x