Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice
When people have access to information sources such as newspaper weather forecasts, drug-package inserts, and mutual-fund brochures, all of which provide convenient descriptions of risky prospects, they can make decisions from description. When people must decide whether to back up their computer...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Psychological science 2004-08, Vol.15 (8), p.534-539 |
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creator | Hertwig, Ralph Barron, Greg Weber, Elke U. Erev, Ido |
description | When people have access to information sources such as newspaper weather forecasts, drug-package inserts, and mutual-fund brochures, all of which provide convenient descriptions of risky prospects, they can make decisions from description. When people must decide whether to back up their computer's hard drive, cross a busy street, or go out on a date, however, they typically do not have any summary description of the possible outcomes or their likelihoods. For such decisions, people can call only on their own encounters with such prospects, making decisions from experience. Decisions from experience and decisions from description can lead to dramatically different choice behavior. In the case of decisions from description, people make choices as if they overweight the probability of rare events, as described by prospect theory. We found that in the case of decisions from experience, in contrast, people make choices as if they underweight the probability of rare events, and we explored the impact of two possible causes of this underweighting--reliance on relatively small samples of information and overweighting of recently sampled information. We conclude with a call for two different theories of risky choice. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00715.x |
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We conclude with a call for two different theories of risky choice.</description><subject>Access to information</subject><subject>Attitudes</subject><subject>Base interest rates</subject><subject>Bumblebees</subject><subject>Choice Behavior</subject><subject>Decision Making</subject><subject>Expected values</subject><subject>Frequentism</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Life Change Events</subject><subject>News media</subject><subject>Paradoxes</subject><subject>Probability</subject><subject>Prospect theory</subject><subject>Risk</subject><subject>Risk-Taking</subject><subject>Statistical median</subject><subject>Term weighting</subject><subject>Vaccination</subject><issn>0956-7976</issn><issn>1467-9280</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2004</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>EIF</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkUFP3DAQha2qqGxpf0KR1UNvCXbsseMj2i5QCQkJ0bPldcYl6W682Fm0_HuS7gpQL8zFGul7b-T3CKGclXycs65kBlShjVZlxZgsGdMcyt0HMuNS6cJUNftIZi_QMfmcc8fG0UJ9IsccKs2MqWfk8if6NrexzzSkuKaL3QZTi71H6vqGDvdIFyGgH2gM9NalcX3Efsi07eltm_8-0fl9bD1-IUfBrTJ-Pbwn5PfF4m5-VVzfXP6an18XHkAMBbpGhcBd4EsDlakNl1IKrr1xnimpVQNLAFhWnteN1qBAClUFqRtukAcmTsiPve8mxYct5sGu2-xxtXI9xm22SmmpWQXvgkIbISRM4Pf_wC5uUz9-wnIDYJji9QjVe8inmHPCYDepXbv0ZDmzUyW2s1PadkrbTpXYf5XY3Sg9Pfhvl2tsXoWHDkYA9kB2f_DN8feNv-11XR5ievGVbAyS8Uo8A8W5nqw</recordid><startdate>20040801</startdate><enddate>20040801</enddate><creator>Hertwig, Ralph</creator><creator>Barron, Greg</creator><creator>Weber, Elke U.</creator><creator>Erev, Ido</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing</general><general>SAGE Publications</general><general>SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC</general><scope>CGR</scope><scope>CUY</scope><scope>CVF</scope><scope>ECM</scope><scope>EIF</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>7X8</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20040801</creationdate><title>Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice</title><author>Hertwig, Ralph ; Barron, Greg ; Weber, Elke U. ; Erev, Ido</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c553t-ead6ff1af1b9529891444317c9ac06476d5b555b2c18d775654362f47d19e1f03</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2004</creationdate><topic>Access to information</topic><topic>Attitudes</topic><topic>Base interest rates</topic><topic>Bumblebees</topic><topic>Choice Behavior</topic><topic>Decision Making</topic><topic>Expected values</topic><topic>Frequentism</topic><topic>Humans</topic><topic>Life Change Events</topic><topic>News media</topic><topic>Paradoxes</topic><topic>Probability</topic><topic>Prospect theory</topic><topic>Risk</topic><topic>Risk-Taking</topic><topic>Statistical median</topic><topic>Term weighting</topic><topic>Vaccination</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Hertwig, Ralph</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Barron, Greg</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Weber, Elke U.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Erev, Ido</creatorcontrib><collection>Medline</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE (Ovid)</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><jtitle>Psychological science</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Hertwig, Ralph</au><au>Barron, Greg</au><au>Weber, Elke U.</au><au>Erev, Ido</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice</atitle><jtitle>Psychological science</jtitle><addtitle>Psychol Sci</addtitle><date>2004-08-01</date><risdate>2004</risdate><volume>15</volume><issue>8</issue><spage>534</spage><epage>539</epage><pages>534-539</pages><issn>0956-7976</issn><eissn>1467-9280</eissn><coden>PSYSET</coden><abstract>When people have access to information sources such as newspaper weather forecasts, drug-package inserts, and mutual-fund brochures, all of which provide convenient descriptions of risky prospects, they can make decisions from description. 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subjects | Access to information Attitudes Base interest rates Bumblebees Choice Behavior Decision Making Expected values Frequentism Humans Life Change Events News media Paradoxes Probability Prospect theory Risk Risk-Taking Statistical median Term weighting Vaccination |
title | Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice |
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