Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice

When people have access to information sources such as newspaper weather forecasts, drug-package inserts, and mutual-fund brochures, all of which provide convenient descriptions of risky prospects, they can make decisions from description. When people must decide whether to back up their computer�...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Psychological science 2004-08, Vol.15 (8), p.534-539
Hauptverfasser: Hertwig, Ralph, Barron, Greg, Weber, Elke U., Erev, Ido
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 539
container_issue 8
container_start_page 534
container_title Psychological science
container_volume 15
creator Hertwig, Ralph
Barron, Greg
Weber, Elke U.
Erev, Ido
description When people have access to information sources such as newspaper weather forecasts, drug-package inserts, and mutual-fund brochures, all of which provide convenient descriptions of risky prospects, they can make decisions from description. When people must decide whether to back up their computer's hard drive, cross a busy street, or go out on a date, however, they typically do not have any summary description of the possible outcomes or their likelihoods. For such decisions, people can call only on their own encounters with such prospects, making decisions from experience. Decisions from experience and decisions from description can lead to dramatically different choice behavior. In the case of decisions from description, people make choices as if they overweight the probability of rare events, as described by prospect theory. We found that in the case of decisions from experience, in contrast, people make choices as if they underweight the probability of rare events, and we explored the impact of two possible causes of this underweighting--reliance on relatively small samples of information and overweighting of recently sampled information. We conclude with a call for two different theories of risky choice.
doi_str_mv 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00715.x
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_66747025</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>40064012</jstor_id><sage_id>10.1111_j.0956-7976.2004.00715.x</sage_id><sourcerecordid>40064012</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c553t-ead6ff1af1b9529891444317c9ac06476d5b555b2c18d775654362f47d19e1f03</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqFkUFP3DAQha2qqGxpf0KR1UNvCXbsseMj2i5QCQkJ0bPldcYl6W682Fm0_HuS7gpQL8zFGul7b-T3CKGclXycs65kBlShjVZlxZgsGdMcyt0HMuNS6cJUNftIZi_QMfmcc8fG0UJ9IsccKs2MqWfk8if6NrexzzSkuKaL3QZTi71H6vqGDvdIFyGgH2gM9NalcX3Efsi07eltm_8-0fl9bD1-IUfBrTJ-Pbwn5PfF4m5-VVzfXP6an18XHkAMBbpGhcBd4EsDlakNl1IKrr1xnimpVQNLAFhWnteN1qBAClUFqRtukAcmTsiPve8mxYct5sGu2-xxtXI9xm22SmmpWQXvgkIbISRM4Pf_wC5uUz9-wnIDYJji9QjVe8inmHPCYDepXbv0ZDmzUyW2s1PadkrbTpXYf5XY3Sg9Pfhvl2tsXoWHDkYA9kB2f_DN8feNv-11XR5ievGVbAyS8Uo8A8W5nqw</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>195590618</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice</title><source>Access via SAGE</source><source>MEDLINE</source><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Complete</source><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><creator>Hertwig, Ralph ; Barron, Greg ; Weber, Elke U. ; Erev, Ido</creator><creatorcontrib>Hertwig, Ralph ; Barron, Greg ; Weber, Elke U. ; Erev, Ido</creatorcontrib><description>When people have access to information sources such as newspaper weather forecasts, drug-package inserts, and mutual-fund brochures, all of which provide convenient descriptions of risky prospects, they can make decisions from description. When people must decide whether to back up their computer's hard drive, cross a busy street, or go out on a date, however, they typically do not have any summary description of the possible outcomes or their likelihoods. For such decisions, people can call only on their own encounters with such prospects, making decisions from experience. Decisions from experience and decisions from description can lead to dramatically different choice behavior. In the case of decisions from description, people make choices as if they overweight the probability of rare events, as described by prospect theory. We found that in the case of decisions from experience, in contrast, people make choices as if they underweight the probability of rare events, and we explored the impact of two possible causes of this underweighting--reliance on relatively small samples of information and overweighting of recently sampled information. We conclude with a call for two different theories of risky choice.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0956-7976</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1467-9280</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00715.x</identifier><identifier>PMID: 15270998</identifier><identifier>CODEN: PSYSET</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Los Angeles, CA: Blackwell Publishing</publisher><subject>Access to information ; Attitudes ; Base interest rates ; Bumblebees ; Choice Behavior ; Decision Making ; Expected values ; Frequentism ; Humans ; Life Change Events ; News media ; Paradoxes ; Probability ; Prospect theory ; Risk ; Risk-Taking ; Statistical median ; Term weighting ; Vaccination</subject><ispartof>Psychological science, 2004-08, Vol.15 (8), p.534-539</ispartof><rights>Copyright 2004 American Psychological Society</rights><rights>2004 American Psychological Society</rights><rights>Copyright Blackwell Publishing Aug 2004</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c553t-ead6ff1af1b9529891444317c9ac06476d5b555b2c18d775654362f47d19e1f03</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c553t-ead6ff1af1b9529891444317c9ac06476d5b555b2c18d775654362f47d19e1f03</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40064012$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/40064012$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,21819,27924,27925,43621,43622,58017,58250</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15270998$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Hertwig, Ralph</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Barron, Greg</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Weber, Elke U.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Erev, Ido</creatorcontrib><title>Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice</title><title>Psychological science</title><addtitle>Psychol Sci</addtitle><description>When people have access to information sources such as newspaper weather forecasts, drug-package inserts, and mutual-fund brochures, all of which provide convenient descriptions of risky prospects, they can make decisions from description. When people must decide whether to back up their computer's hard drive, cross a busy street, or go out on a date, however, they typically do not have any summary description of the possible outcomes or their likelihoods. For such decisions, people can call only on their own encounters with such prospects, making decisions from experience. Decisions from experience and decisions from description can lead to dramatically different choice behavior. In the case of decisions from description, people make choices as if they overweight the probability of rare events, as described by prospect theory. We found that in the case of decisions from experience, in contrast, people make choices as if they underweight the probability of rare events, and we explored the impact of two possible causes of this underweighting--reliance on relatively small samples of information and overweighting of recently sampled information. We conclude with a call for two different theories of risky choice.</description><subject>Access to information</subject><subject>Attitudes</subject><subject>Base interest rates</subject><subject>Bumblebees</subject><subject>Choice Behavior</subject><subject>Decision Making</subject><subject>Expected values</subject><subject>Frequentism</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Life Change Events</subject><subject>News media</subject><subject>Paradoxes</subject><subject>Probability</subject><subject>Prospect theory</subject><subject>Risk</subject><subject>Risk-Taking</subject><subject>Statistical median</subject><subject>Term weighting</subject><subject>Vaccination</subject><issn>0956-7976</issn><issn>1467-9280</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2004</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>EIF</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkUFP3DAQha2qqGxpf0KR1UNvCXbsseMj2i5QCQkJ0bPldcYl6W682Fm0_HuS7gpQL8zFGul7b-T3CKGclXycs65kBlShjVZlxZgsGdMcyt0HMuNS6cJUNftIZi_QMfmcc8fG0UJ9IsccKs2MqWfk8if6NrexzzSkuKaL3QZTi71H6vqGDvdIFyGgH2gM9NalcX3Efsi07eltm_8-0fl9bD1-IUfBrTJ-Pbwn5PfF4m5-VVzfXP6an18XHkAMBbpGhcBd4EsDlakNl1IKrr1xnimpVQNLAFhWnteN1qBAClUFqRtukAcmTsiPve8mxYct5sGu2-xxtXI9xm22SmmpWQXvgkIbISRM4Pf_wC5uUz9-wnIDYJji9QjVe8inmHPCYDepXbv0ZDmzUyW2s1PadkrbTpXYf5XY3Sg9Pfhvl2tsXoWHDkYA9kB2f_DN8feNv-11XR5ievGVbAyS8Uo8A8W5nqw</recordid><startdate>20040801</startdate><enddate>20040801</enddate><creator>Hertwig, Ralph</creator><creator>Barron, Greg</creator><creator>Weber, Elke U.</creator><creator>Erev, Ido</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing</general><general>SAGE Publications</general><general>SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC</general><scope>CGR</scope><scope>CUY</scope><scope>CVF</scope><scope>ECM</scope><scope>EIF</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>7X8</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20040801</creationdate><title>Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice</title><author>Hertwig, Ralph ; Barron, Greg ; Weber, Elke U. ; Erev, Ido</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c553t-ead6ff1af1b9529891444317c9ac06476d5b555b2c18d775654362f47d19e1f03</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2004</creationdate><topic>Access to information</topic><topic>Attitudes</topic><topic>Base interest rates</topic><topic>Bumblebees</topic><topic>Choice Behavior</topic><topic>Decision Making</topic><topic>Expected values</topic><topic>Frequentism</topic><topic>Humans</topic><topic>Life Change Events</topic><topic>News media</topic><topic>Paradoxes</topic><topic>Probability</topic><topic>Prospect theory</topic><topic>Risk</topic><topic>Risk-Taking</topic><topic>Statistical median</topic><topic>Term weighting</topic><topic>Vaccination</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Hertwig, Ralph</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Barron, Greg</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Weber, Elke U.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Erev, Ido</creatorcontrib><collection>Medline</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE (Ovid)</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><jtitle>Psychological science</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Hertwig, Ralph</au><au>Barron, Greg</au><au>Weber, Elke U.</au><au>Erev, Ido</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice</atitle><jtitle>Psychological science</jtitle><addtitle>Psychol Sci</addtitle><date>2004-08-01</date><risdate>2004</risdate><volume>15</volume><issue>8</issue><spage>534</spage><epage>539</epage><pages>534-539</pages><issn>0956-7976</issn><eissn>1467-9280</eissn><coden>PSYSET</coden><abstract>When people have access to information sources such as newspaper weather forecasts, drug-package inserts, and mutual-fund brochures, all of which provide convenient descriptions of risky prospects, they can make decisions from description. When people must decide whether to back up their computer's hard drive, cross a busy street, or go out on a date, however, they typically do not have any summary description of the possible outcomes or their likelihoods. For such decisions, people can call only on their own encounters with such prospects, making decisions from experience. Decisions from experience and decisions from description can lead to dramatically different choice behavior. In the case of decisions from description, people make choices as if they overweight the probability of rare events, as described by prospect theory. We found that in the case of decisions from experience, in contrast, people make choices as if they underweight the probability of rare events, and we explored the impact of two possible causes of this underweighting--reliance on relatively small samples of information and overweighting of recently sampled information. We conclude with a call for two different theories of risky choice.</abstract><cop>Los Angeles, CA</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing</pub><pmid>15270998</pmid><doi>10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00715.x</doi><tpages>6</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0956-7976
ispartof Psychological science, 2004-08, Vol.15 (8), p.534-539
issn 0956-7976
1467-9280
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_66747025
source Access via SAGE; MEDLINE; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing
subjects Access to information
Attitudes
Base interest rates
Bumblebees
Choice Behavior
Decision Making
Expected values
Frequentism
Humans
Life Change Events
News media
Paradoxes
Probability
Prospect theory
Risk
Risk-Taking
Statistical median
Term weighting
Vaccination
title Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-18T23%3A36%3A38IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Decisions%20from%20Experience%20and%20the%20Effect%20of%20Rare%20Events%20in%20Risky%20Choice&rft.jtitle=Psychological%20science&rft.au=Hertwig,%20Ralph&rft.date=2004-08-01&rft.volume=15&rft.issue=8&rft.spage=534&rft.epage=539&rft.pages=534-539&rft.issn=0956-7976&rft.eissn=1467-9280&rft.coden=PSYSET&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00715.x&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E40064012%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=195590618&rft_id=info:pmid/15270998&rft_jstor_id=40064012&rft_sage_id=10.1111_j.0956-7976.2004.00715.x&rfr_iscdi=true