The maximum incentive solutions in bargaining problems

This paper is concerned with a new approach to solutions of bargaining problems, i.e. with a rule by which participants of a nonantagonistic game select, from the set of all feasible outcomes, a ‘fair’ outcome. A rather diverse class of games is considered, and the selection in a concrete game is sp...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Mathematical social sciences 1992-08, Vol.24 (1), p.1-18
Hauptverfasser:	Rotaŕ, Vladimir I., Smirnov, Eugene N.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bargaining Bargaining problem cooperative game Games Higher Education monotonic solution Nash solution Negotiation
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!