The Politics of Blame
ONE OF THE MORE INTERESTING ASPECTS OF THE SECRET SALE OF ARMS TO IRAN IS THE IMPACT THE REVELATIONS HAD ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POPULARITY. IN ONE MONTH THE PERCENTAGE OF AMERICANS WHO APPROVED OF HIS JOB PERFORMANCE FELL BY 21 POINTS. FOR MOST OTHER PRESIDENTS IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS PLU...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Brookings review 1987-04, Vol.5 (2), p.43-47 |
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| container_end_page | 47 |
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| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 43 |
| container_title | The Brookings review |
| container_volume | 5 |
| creator | Weaver, R. Kent |
| description | ONE OF THE MORE INTERESTING ASPECTS OF THE SECRET SALE OF ARMS TO IRAN IS THE IMPACT THE REVELATIONS HAD ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POPULARITY. IN ONE MONTH THE PERCENTAGE OF AMERICANS WHO APPROVED OF HIS JOB PERFORMANCE FELL BY 21 POINTS. FOR MOST OTHER PRESIDENTS IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS PLUMMET IN POPULARITY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SURPRISING. BUT REAGAN WAS NOT A TYPICAL PRESIDENT. FOR NEARLY SIX YEARS HE WAS LABELED THE "TEFLON PRESIDENT" BECAUSE NO FAILURE OR SCANDAL IN HIS ADMINISTRATION SEEMED TO STICK TO HIM PERSONALLY. THE TEFLON PRESIDENCY WAS NO ACCIDENT, HOWEVER. REAGAN'S PERSONALITY WAS A MAJOR ASSET IN DEFLECTING BLAME. BUT IT WAS BUTTRESSED BY A SERIES OF CAREFUL STRATEGIC CHOICES, INCLUDING A WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE POLICY OBJECTIVES WHEN THE POLITICAL COSTS BECOME TOO HIGH. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.2307/20079973 |
| format | Article |
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Kent</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The Politics of Blame</atitle><jtitle>The Brookings review</jtitle><date>1987-04-01</date><risdate>1987</risdate><volume>5</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>43</spage><epage>47</epage><pages>43-47</pages><issn>0745-1253</issn><abstract>ONE OF THE MORE INTERESTING ASPECTS OF THE SECRET SALE OF ARMS TO IRAN IS THE IMPACT THE REVELATIONS HAD ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POPULARITY. IN ONE MONTH THE PERCENTAGE OF AMERICANS WHO APPROVED OF HIS JOB PERFORMANCE FELL BY 21 POINTS. FOR MOST OTHER PRESIDENTS IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS PLUMMET IN POPULARITY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SURPRISING. BUT REAGAN WAS NOT A TYPICAL PRESIDENT. FOR NEARLY SIX YEARS HE WAS LABELED THE "TEFLON PRESIDENT" BECAUSE NO FAILURE OR SCANDAL IN HIS ADMINISTRATION SEEMED TO STICK TO HIM PERSONALLY. THE TEFLON PRESIDENCY WAS NO ACCIDENT, HOWEVER. REAGAN'S PERSONALITY WAS A MAJOR ASSET IN DEFLECTING BLAME. 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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0745-1253 |
| ispartof | The Brookings review, 1987-04, Vol.5 (2), p.43-47 |
| issn | 0745-1253 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_61230414 |
| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Periodicals Index Online; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Blame Congressional voting Electronic voting Incumbents IRAN CONTRA ARMS SCANDAL Legislators Political campaigns Political interest groups Politicians RONALD REAGAN Voting |
| title | The Politics of Blame |
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