The Reciprocal Relationship between State Defense Interest and Committee Representation in Congress
Does prior representation of a state on a Congressional defense committee lead to higher levels of per capita defense contracts, or do higher levels of prior per capita contract awards to a state increase its probability of being represented on a defense committee? To solve this puzzle, we estimate...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 1999-06, Vol.99 (3/4), p.455-463 |
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| container_title | Public choice |
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| creator | Carsey, Thomas M. Rundquist, Barry |
| description | Does prior representation of a state on a Congressional defense committee lead to higher levels of per capita defense contracts, or do higher levels of prior per capita contract awards to a state increase its probability of being represented on a defense committee? To solve this puzzle, we estimate a cross-lagged three-equation model on data from all 50 states from 1963 to 1989 using maximum likelihood within LISREL. We find a substantial reciprocal but non-confounding relationship between representation and the allocation of benefits for the House, but not for the Senate. Thus, for the House, this more appropriate model of distributive politics in Congress supports both the committee-induced benefits hypothesis and the recruitment hypothesis. Further, the paper elaborates on how this reciprocal relationship plays out over time. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1023/A:1018371622808 |
| format | Article |
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SpringerNature Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; Jstor Complete Legacy; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete |
| subjects | Committees Congress CONGRESS (ALL NATIONS) Congressional committees Constituents Defence policy Defense Defense contracts DEFENSE POLICY AND SPENDING Hypotheses Ideology Legislation Legislative power Mathematical independent variables Maximum likelihood estimation Military defense Military expenditure Modeling Per capita Political behavior Political conditions Political representation Political theory Representation State Government STATES Studies U.S.A United States United States Senate Upper houses Variables |
| title | The Reciprocal Relationship between State Defense Interest and Committee Representation in Congress |
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