The Local Politician: Loyal to the Party or Responsive to the Local Constituency?
The community equilibrium model of local fiscal policy‐making perceives of political leaders as ‘invisible hands’ or as anonymous, reactive figures who automatically adapt to the preferences of the citizenry. The party model, in contrast, views political leaders as willful representatives of certain...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Scandinavian political studies 1987, Vol.10 (2), p.97-109 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Schreiben Sie den ersten Kommentar!