Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets
The first goal of this paper is to provide a simple and general test of the presence of asymmetric information in contractual relationships within a competitive context. We also argue that insurance data are particularly well suited to such empirical investigations. To illustrate this claim, we use...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of political economy 2000-02, Vol.108 (1), p.56-78 |
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| container_title | The Journal of political economy |
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| creator | Chiappori, Pierre‐Andre Salanie, Bernard |
| description | The first goal of this paper is to provide a simple and general test of the presence of asymmetric information in contractual relationships within a competitive context. We also argue that insurance data are particularly well suited to such empirical investigations. To illustrate this claim, we use data on contracts and accidents to investigate the extent of asymmetric information in the French market for automobile insurance. Using various parametric and nonparametric methods, we find no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in this market. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1086/262111 |
| format | Article |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; University of Chicago Press Journals (Full run); Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | Accidents Adverse selection Asymmetric information Automobile accidents Automobile insurance Automobiles Contracts Data Econometrics Economic models Economic Theory Empirical research Equilibrium France Information Information asymmetry Insurance Insurance companies Insurance coverage Insurance deductibles Insurance premiums Market Moral hazard Political economy Pricing policies Principal-agent theory Probability Studies |
| title | Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets |
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